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PREFACE 
This study is a st.age and sequence investigation of the 
hierarchy of operational structures involved in the child's 
acquisition of gender identity. It is a study in the Piaget 
tradition, taki.ng its point of departure from Lawrence 
Kohlberg' s theorizing. In the recent Handbook of Socialization 
Theory and Research (Goslin (ed.), 1969) the followi.ng comnent 
appears: 
!!Since the cognitive developmental theory sex-typing 
was proposed recently, there have not yet been any 
direct tests of specific hypothesis derived from 
theory and adequate evaluation is not possible. 
Nevertheless, Kohlberg's presentation is intriguing, 
thoughtful, stimulating and plausable. It cites· 
relevant supportive evidence and emphasises a number 
.of problem:; neglected by other theories of sex-
typing." (Mussen, 1969, p. 726.) 
This study investigates qualitative changes in the child's 
perception of his social world involvi.ng-· his sense of self and 
his sex-role usi.ng measures that were devised by the author. 
The study demonstrates that the child's se:i1,Ual and social 
attitudes are neither a direct reflection of cultural patterns 
nor a· direct reflection of innate structures, but are patterned 
by the child's cognitive organization of his social world along 
sex-role dimensions. 
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(i) 
Sununary 
The present study of the acquisition and development of the 
child's sex-typed behaviours and attitudes is pursued in the 
Piagetian cognitive developmental tradition. Qualitative changes 
in the child's perceptions of himself and his physical and social 
world are described as changes in menta.i structure. . The cognitive 
struetures are made up of categories of experience or s~hemas. 
The schemas are organizations of actions upon objects which possess 
the quality of mobility. Development of the cognitive structure 
is facilitated by old structures being continually fitted to new 
functions, and new structures evolvi.ng to fill old functions under 
changed circumstances. Through age and experience, schemas fo~ 
hierarchical integrations of increasing differentiation moving 
from predominant use of lower to higher level operations. 
This study accounts for the qualitative changes in the child's 
gender self-concept with age development by investigating the 
changes in the structure of the child 1 s cognitive schema. The 
cognitive developmental approach evidenced in the work of Pi.aget 
and Inhelder deals comprehensively with the acquisition and general 
stabilization of constancies in the physical world; the concepts of 
number, weight, mass, time, etc., only recently has it been 
proposed to account for the development of gender concepts 
(Kohlberg, 1966). 
One of the central postulates of this research is that the 
stabilization of gender concepts in the area of socialization is 
only one aspect of the general stabilization of constancies, and 
(ii) 
that a firm gender identity develops and becomes secure in a fashion 
parallel to the development of physical concepts. 
The research strategy attends to the problem of how the cognitive 
representation of the sex-role identity of the young child not only 
differs from the mature adult, but how it moves from predominantly 
lower to higher levels of operation. The research strategy therefore 
employs a stage and sequence method of analysis demonstrating: 
(a) that stages imply qualitative changes in children's modes of 
solving the same problem at different ages. 
(b) that these different modes of thought form an invarient sequence 
or succession in individual development; while cultural factors 
may slow down, stop or speed up development, they do not change 
its sequence. 
(c) Each of these different sequential modes of thought represent 
a structured whole. 
A given stage response on a task does not just represent a specific 
response determined by knowledge and familiarity with a particular 
task or tasks similar to it. Rather it represents an underlying 
thought organization. Hence the method of enquiry adopted is 
described as the 'revised clinical method'. It is a method which 
is capable of studying the aontent or structure of the child's 
thought. The content of the child's thought is particularly 
difficult to investigate as young children do not find it easy to 
communicate their thoughts. In this study, whenever possible, the 
examinor's questioning refers to concrete objects set before the 
child. In some instances the child is required to make judgements 
about the-materials before him, at other times he is required to 
manipulates them in this way revealing: 
(a) whether he understands the problem as set down by the 
examiner, as well as 
(b) providing him with a means to express himself. 
(iii) 
The data is recorded on two levels; at a quantitative level permitting 
a statistical analysis of the responses between age groups and within 
age groups (this data is presented in the tables and graphs), at the 
qualitative level the actual structure of the child's thought is 
analysed as evidence of a particular stage of operations. 
The sample population was made up of 125 middle class white 
boys and girls between the ages of 4 and 8 years of age, with 25 
children in each age group o The study comprises of 5 sections with 
S measures designed by the author which were administered to these 
subjects. (See Table 1) 
The first chapter introduces the concept of 'gender identity' 
as generated by the cognitive developmental approach, i.e. that the 
child's basic sex-role identity is largely the result of a self-
categorization as male or female made relatively early in 
development (2-3 years). Subsequently the intuitive self catego~ 
rization broadens and becomes operationally stabilized as the 
cognitive structure develops. 
A Gender Identity Measure was developed by the author to 
investigate the st.ages of development and the d.egree of constancy 
which children between 4-8 years of .age attribute to gender 
assignment. This measure is intended to be related to the more 
detailed·l.nvestigations of the cognitive processes at each stage 
(iv) 
of development described in the subsequent chapters. 
The theme that emerges is that Gender Identity as a cognitive 
construct passes through a vertical hierarchy of operations which 
means that at each age, not only does the child's age-role 
definition alter, but also the way he perceives his social 
environment and interprets his social relationships differ 
quantitatively from one stage to the next. 
The performance of 125 children on the Gender Identity Measure 
is statistically treated and graphically represented (Table 2, 
Figure 1), revealing age related stages of development analogous 
to Piaget's classic experiments of conservation in the physical 
worldo 
In the chapter, Gender Ascription, the change from the 
physical to the psychofogical-normative modes of c_ognition is 
investigated, demonstrating the influence of body size on early 
intuitive gender ascription. The child at the preconceptual 
level begins to reconstruct all that has developed at the sensori-
motor level, but this time at the level of representational thought, 
facilitated by the use of language. But as yet there are no 
operations, i.e. no conservation. The child at the preconceptual 
stage uses ready made schemas arrived from his sensori-motor 
experience to interpret these social realities. 
The data (see Tables 3, 4, 5) reveals that children are still 
confused about genital differences at an age (4 - 5 years)when they 
clearly stereotype gender in terms of size, strength and aggression, 
which suggests that genital considerations do not form the direct 
basis of sex-role definition. Rather, it appears that it is only 
at the stage of about 7 years when the child realises that genitals 
are the basis for gender ascription that they acquire new signifi-
cance and centrality. 
(v) 
The chapter on Gender Classification investig.ates how the 
· child's thought. gradually becomes freed from defining social and 
behavioural characteristics in terms of physical attributes and 
becomes capable of establishing properties as invariant in the 
face of irrelevant changes. The child begins to cat.egorize part 
from part. From an egocentric self-label of 'boy' or .'girl' it 
is now possible for him to conceive of a class of beings with 
common defining properties. 
The data from three classification tasks from 75 children 
between the ages of four and six years is presented in Table 6 and 
7. The findings indicate: 
(a) The reality judgements leading to appropriate self-categoriza-
tion and categorization of others are judgements which 
follow a r.egular course of age development and 
(b) The difficulties that the child experiences in establishing 
gender definitions closely parallel his difficulaties in 
establishing stable definitions of physical objects in general, 
and the former are resolved as the latter are. 
In the chapter Gender Class Inclusion, the investigation 
attends to how the child becomes capable of comparing past to the 
whole destroying the part as previously. The means that he begins 
to perceive boys and men as subgroups of the class of males and 
girls and women as part of the class of females. 
The measures devised by the author were based on Piaget's 
classic experiments of class inclusion. In Table 8 and 9 the 
data from gender class inclusion tasks and physical class inclusion 
tasks from the sample of 100 children between 5 and 8 years of age 
(vi) 
is presented. The operations involved in the gender tasks and 
physical tasks were compared and found to be the same. 
The implications of the age at which these operations take 
place is discussed in terms of the cognitive developmental 
interpretation of identification, i.e. that identification proper 
depends on the ability to conceive of one 1 s own sex parent and 
oneself in the same class of beings, that identification is the 
corl8equence rather than the cause of gender identity as in 
traditional theories. 
The final chapter, Gender-Age-Time, invest.igates the stages 
and sequence of operations in the development of the child's 
concept of gender:. age and time. The research strategy is both 
theoretically and practically related to Piaget's investigations 
through discovering how the child succeeds in organizing the time 
of external events, at first intuitively and then by a set of 
qualitative operations. 
The findings are categorized into stages, the data appears 
in Table 10 showing the relationship between the sequence of the 
stage and the .age of subjects. Qualitative trends revealing 
the logical difficulties encountered at each stage are drawn 
from the children's protocols. 
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1. 
A COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL STUDY OF CHILDREN'S SEX-ROLE .DEVELOPMENT 
The present study is an attempt to investigate the child's 
acquisition of sex-typed behaviours and attitudes guided by an approach 
labelled 'cognitive developmental' incorporating a set of assumptions 
and research strategies common to a variety of specific theories of 
social and cognitive development such as J.M. Baldwin (1906}., J. Dewey 
(1930) '· J .H. Mead (1934), Loevinger (1960), and more specifically 
Piaget (1948, 1952) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1966, 1969). 
The assumption that we begin with is that the child's sexual 
and social attitudes are neither a direct reflection of cultural 
patterns nor a direct reflection of innate structures, but are 
patterned by the child's c.ognitive organization of his social world 
along sex-role dimensions. 
The development of sex-typing is conceived as an aspect of 
cognitive growth which involves basic qualitative changes with age 
in the child's mode of thinking and concomrnitantly in his perceptions 
of the physical and social world, including his sense of self and 
sex-role. Learning, particularly observational learning, plays some 
role in sex-role acquisition, but the most significant factor is the 
child's aognitive aativipy -- his active selection and organization 
I 
of his perceptions, knowledge and understanding. 
Before considering the application of the cognitive developmental 
approach t~ sex-role development, we shall outline the basic charac-
teristics of these theories in general and Piaget and Kohlberg's 
contribution in particular. 
2. 
Cognitive Structural Stages 
The cognitive developmental approach to children's sex-role 
development used in this study, departs s.ignificantly from the 
mentalistic-associationist theories of cognition, as psychoanalysis, 
as well as behaviouristic theories such as S - R mediation theories. 
The most striking departure from the more popular approaches 
above, is the way in which the qualitative changes in the child's 
perceptions of himself, his physical and his social world are 
accounted for. Followi.ng the Pi.agetian tradition, such changes are 
described as changes in mentaZ structure which are disti.nguished 
from behaviour changes or learning, due to the rate or intensity of 
the response or the pairi.ng of a response with a particular stimulus 
as defined by the parameters of associationistic learning. Rather, 
the concept of mental structure refers to the general characteristics 
of shape, pattern or organization of the response and the rules for 
processing information or for connecting experienced events. 
The Piaget concept of mental structure is derived from the 
biological explanation of the adaptive ability and development of 
biological structures which are stimulated to evolve to suit the 
life of an area with its particular geographic and climatic conditions. 
It is Piaget's view that the behaviour of the human strongly resembles 
the biological picture of a complex, mutually regulatory system in 
equilibrium involving the continuous suiting of old structures to new 
functions, and the development of new structures to suit old functions 
in changed circumstances. 
3. 
The Schema 
For Piaget, the behavioural equivalent of the biological 
structure is the 'schema'. The schema differs in a number of ways 
from a response to a stimulus: It is true that in its simplest 
form the schema can be nothing more than a predictable response to 
a stimulus at the reflex level, but this where the similarity ends. 
Even the earliest schema described Piaget -- the sensorimotor sucking 
reflex in response to stimulation on the inside of the mouth -- in 
practice differs from a response to a stimulus in that it has the 
quality of mobility, and this mobility increases with age. For 
example, within a few weeks after birth the sucking schema has 
already expanded to include a variety of acts under many different 
circumstances. For instance, searching for the breast when the 
child is placed against the mother's body and performing sucking 
movements while watching the mother prepare food for him. Later 
sucking is applied to a variety of nonnutritive objects such as 
blocks, spoons and the thumb. Because of its mobility, the schema 
can be applied to objects never before encountered. The mobility 
increases if the schema is employed for obtaining some goal in 
addition to providing satisfaction as an end in itself. 
The example we have given is of an overt (sensorimotor) schema, 
however Piaget uses the term at another level to describe internalized 
thought processes (cognitive schemas). What is the justification 
for including both sensorimotor and cognitive schemas under the same 
conceptual label? There are a number of reasons: For Piaget, 
cognitive structures are always structures of action upon objects as 
4 .• 
much as the overt schemas are structures of action; He maintains 
that every schema has certain unitary properties which justify the 
asertion that all actions involved in it are parts of a single 
schema. Conceptual thinking to him involves mental acts such as 
putting things together or relating events, and drawing implications. 
Further, the cognitive schemas derive from the sensorimotor schemas 
by a process of internalisation. Piaget shows developmentally how 
the primative schemas of the neonate gradually broaden, merge with 
one another, differentiate, and become more mobile and eventually 
acquire the organisation that marks operational systems. An 
operational system is the integration of a number of schemas into a 
coherent logical system. The child who is capable of combining 
objects to form classes, and combining classes to form larger 
classes, or conversely is able to divide members of a large class 
into subclasses is said to be at the stage of concrete or formal 
operations (7-8 years). 
According to Piaget: 
"A cognitive operation consists of joining objects to a 
class to construct a classification, or putting things 
in a series; or an operation would consist of counting 
or measuring. An operation or a 'process' which is 
the essence of knowledge, is a set of actions modify-
ing the object and enabling the knower to get at the 
structure of the transformation The operational 
structures are what seem to me to constitute the basis 
of knowledge, the natural psychological reality, in 
terms of which we must understand the development is to 
knowledge. The central problem of development is to 
understand the formulation, elaboration organisation 




So far, we see that the cognitive developmental approach differs 
from the associationistic theories of learning: 
1. By explaining basic development in terms of transformations 
of cognitive structure involving a description of parameters 
of organisational wholes or systems of internal relations. 
2. The cognitive structures are made up of categories of 
experience (schemas), the organisation of which is always an 
o.rganisation of actions upon objects, rather than a passive 
connecting of experienced events through external associa-
tions and repetitions. The connecting of experienced events 
or processing of information is carried out by selective and 
active processes of attention, information gathering 
strategies, motivated thinking, etc. 
3. The schemas possess the quality of mobiZity which increases 
with age. Development of the cognitive structure is thus 
facilitated: old structures are continually being fitted to 
new functions, and new structures evolve to fill old 
functions under changed circumstances. Through age and 
experience, schemas form hierarchical integrations of 
increasing differentiation moving from predominant use of 
lower to higher level operations. The qualitative changes 
in a child's mode of cognition with age development are 
accounted for by the changes in the structure of the child's 
cognitive schema. 
6. -
4. A further important assumption made by the cognitive 
developmental approach regarding the development of the 
cognitive structure is that it is the result of a process 
of interaction between the structure of the organism and 
between the structure of the environment rather than the 
direct result of learning (in the sense of a direct shaping 
of the organism's responses to accord with environmental 
structures. 
In accounting for developmental changes, the cognitive developmental 
assumption of 'interaction' deals with issues relating to the loca-
tion of the principles producing basic mental structure within or 
without the organism.in contrast to organismic maturational theories 
like those of Lorenz (1965), and Gesell (1954) in which the 
patterning of age-specific behavioural forms is primarily due to the 
unfolding of genetic structures, and in contrast to environmentalists 
beginning with John Locke, J.B. Watson and Skinner (1965), who may 
allow for genetic factors in personality, but assume that the basic 
structure of complex responses results from the structure of the 
child's environment. Both specific structures and general cognitive 
structures, like categories of space, time and causality, are believed 
to be reflections of structures existing outside the child --
structurings given by the physical and social world. (Kessen, 1965.) 
In other words, the cognitive developmental assumption of basic 
mental structure as being the result of an interaction between certain 
organismic structuring tendencies and the structure of the outside 
world rather than reflecting either one directly, contrasts with the 
maturationist assumption that basic mental structure results from 
innate patterning, and the learning theory assumption that basic 
mental structure is the result of the patterning or association of 
events in the outside world. 
The above assumptions hold for cognitive development in 
general, in describing ways of thinking about both physical and 
social objects. However, the present study dealing with social 
social-emotional development, i.e. sex-role development, requires 
7. 
the addition of four further assumptions adapted from Kohlberg (1969). 
1. 'Affective' and 'cognitive' development and functioning are not 
distinct realms, but parallel. They represent different perspectives 
and contexts in defining structural change. 
2. There is a fundamental unity of personality organisation and 
development termed the 'ego' or the self. Psychosexual, moral and 
general social dvelopment are united by their common reference to a 
single concept of self in a single social world with social standards. 
Social development is, in essence, the restructuring of the concept of 
self in its relationship to concepts of other people, conceived as a 
being in a common social world with social standards. 
3. All the basic prossess involved in 'physical' cognitions, and in 
stimulating developmental changes in these cognitions, are also basic 
to social development. In addition, however, social cognition always 
involves 'Pole taking'. i.e. awareness that the other is in some way 
like the self, and that the other knows or is responsive to the self 
in a system of complementary expectations. Accordingly, develop-
mental changes in the social self reflect parallel changes in 
8. 
conceptions of the social world. 
4. The direction of social or ego development is towards an 
equilibrium or reciprocity between the self's actions and those of 
others toward the self. The social analogy to logical and physical 
conservations is the maintainance of an ego-identity throughout the 
transformations of various role relationships. (We find evidence 
of this analogy in our investigation of the child's belief of his 
own unchangeable gender identity, which developes at the same age as 
physical conservations. See chapters on Gender Identity and Gender 
Classification.) 
Al'O.V"'l"'J 
The Acquisition of Gender Identity: The Social., and Psychoanalytic 
Approaches 
In order to understand how the cognitive developmental approach 
differs from the psychoanalytic and social learning approaches with 
regard to the acquisition of gender identity, we shall describe the 
latter orientations briefly. 
For the psychoanalytic theory, 'the child's gender definition is 
derived from a process of "identification". This term refers to the 
process whereby, "An individual may be observed to respond to the 
behaviour of other people or objects by initiating in fantasy or 
reality the same behaviour himself ... the individual strives to 
behave in a way that is exactly like that of the object." (Sanford, 
1955, p. 202.) . 
For identification to take place, the motivation postulated is 
anxiety over anticipated aggression from a threatening and powerful 
father. (A. Freud, 1946; Sarnoff, 1951.) Around the age of 5-6 
the boy's incestuous wishes toward the mother are very strong, but 
are counter balanced by the child's fear of his father's strength 
9. 
and the possibility of punishment, particularly castration. Since 
the boy cannot hope to vanquish his father and win his mother, he 
copes with this by "becoming one with him", by introjecting him and 
thus avoiding threat as well as, presumably, enjoining the mother 
vicariously. This process is called "identification with the 
aggressor". (Anna Freud, 1937) or "defensive identification" .. 
(Mowrer, 1950). Sanford (1955) referred to this as "identification 
proper". 
The cognitive developmental view of identification differs from 
the psychoanalytic in the followi_ng regards: 
(a) Identification is viewed as a cognitive structural stage of 
more general immitative or social-sharing processes. 
(b) Accordingly it is not uniquely dependant upon particular motives 
and ties only present in the early parent-child relationship. 
(c) Identifications are not totally fixed, irreversible, or 
"internalized". Rather identifications are "solutions" to develop-
mental tasks which may change in object or nature with new develop-
mental tasks. 
The Social Learning View 
The social-learning view also describes the child's gender 
identity in terms of 'identification' with the same-sex parent. 
This theory takes little account of the oedipus conflict, although 
recognizing it does occur in some cultures. It argues that the son 
identifies with the father beaause he has been rewarded by·him and 
therefore wishes to be like him. (Mischell, 1966.) The social-
learni.ng theory maintains that it is possible for boy's to make an 
adequate mil.le identification and at the same time continue loving 
the mother. The identification is better consolidated if the boy 
has a strong and loving father than if he has not. The affection 
10. 
that he has for his father, under fortunate circumstances, grows 
stronger with age. As a result of it, and of general influence, 
the boy begins to immitate his father, hence acquire a masculine 
identity with appropriate sex-typed behaviour. There is no 
mechanism postulated why the boy should want to shift his affection 
from the mother to the father as in Freudian theory. In fact, 
withdrawal of the mother's affection should result in increased 
identification with her in terms of Sears (1957, p. 154) "dependency 
drive sequence". 
In terms of strict learning principals the close attachment 
the boy has with his mother during the first five years should 
result in a feminine identification which is obviously not the case. 
The alternative to the psychoanalytic and social-learning 
postulations of the acquisition of gender-identity is the cognitive 
developmental approach, recently formulated by Kohlberg (1966). In 
the following section we describe the principies of this orientation. 
11. 
KOHLBERG'S COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY OF SEX-TYPING 
Since the present investigation takes its departure from 
Lawrence Kohlberg's formulation (Kohlberg, 1966), it is ncessary to 
summarize the cognitive mechanisms whereby children acquire sex-role 
concepts and how they are translated into masculine-feminine values 
according to this theorist. The child's initial conception of 
sex-role stems from: 
1iimportant 'natural components of patterning i.e. aspects 
of sex-role attitudes which are universal across cultures 
and family structures and which appear relatively early 
in the child's development. This patterning of sex-role 
is essentially 'cognitive' in that it is rooted in the 
child's conceptions of physical things, the bodies of 
himself and of others, as he relates body concepts to his 
conceptions of a social order which makes functional use 
of sex catogories in quite universal ways. Rather than 
biological instinct, it is the child's cognitive 
organization of social role concepts around universal 
physical dimensions that account for the existence of 
universals in sex-role attitudes." (Kohlberg, 1966, 
p. 82.) 
According to Kohlberg, sex-typing is initiated by the very 
early self definition or labelling, beginning with the hearing and 
learning of the words 'boy' and 'girl'. By the age of two or three,. 
children know their own self labels, and within the next few years 
they label others according to conventional cues. The child 
regards his sex definition as an 'abstract self-concept' which, when 
stabilized, is practically irreversible, "maintained by a motivated 
adaptation to physical social reality and by the need to preserve a 
12. 
stable and positive self image". (Kohl berg, 1966, p. 88 . .) 
The child's basic self categorization as 'boy' or 'girl' become 
a major organizer and determinant of many of his activities, values 
and attitudes. The boy in effect says, "I am a boy, therefore I 
want to do boy things, therefore the opportunity to do boy things 
(and gain approval for doing them) is rewarding". (Kohl berg, 1966, 
p. 89.) 
At the same time that the child begins to understand the 
principle of conservation at about five or six years of age -- i.e. 
the fact that physical properties such as mass, number and weight 
are stable and invarient -- his own sex self concept or gender 
identity becomes stabilized. With further cognitive development he 
acquires a number of cross cultural stereotypes of masculine and 
feminine behaviour -- of male as active, dominant and powerful and 
aggressive, and females as more nurturant. These are not derived 
from parental behaviour or direct tuition, but rather stern from 
universal perceived sex differences in bodily structure and 
capacities. 
Once established, basic sex-role concepts generate new sex-
typed values and attitudes Kohlberg postulates a number of mechanisms 
by which sex-role concepts become directly translated into rnasculine-
ferninine values: 
(a) Beginning with the assumption that the child is a valueing and 
value-seeking ·o_rganisrn in that the infant has a tendency to explore, 
learn, act upon and master external objects and stimuli, rather than 
treating each tendency as a distinct primary need or drive, Kohlberg 
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is adapti.ng Piaget's notion of assimilation i.e. , "the child's 
tendency to respond to new interests that are consistent with old 
ones". (Kohlberg, 1966, p. 112.) 
By the age of two or three there are clear-cut differences in 
interests, activities and personality characteristics. New objects 
or activities consistent with well established interests and 
preferences are assimilated, whil discrepant ones are not. 
(b) Children make value judgements consistent with their self-
concepts of sex-role. The three year old has a "naive and egocen-
tric tendency to value anything associated with or like himself" as 
best (Kohlberg, 1966, p. 113) and hence values and seeks objects and 
activities that are representative of his own sex. 
(c) The motivational forces are general "drive neutral" motives for 
effectance and competence, which orient the child both towards 
cognitive adaptation to a structured reality and towards the main-
tainance of self-esteem. Young children tend to associate positive, 
self-enhancing values with sex-role stereotypes and these values are 
motivating. According to Kohlberg: 
'.'The stereotyping revealed in the same-sex preferences 
of both boys and girls are too generalised to be simply 
extensions of innate or early acquired sex-differences 
in specific interest and temperament." (1966, p. 120) 
Nor can they be explained by same-sex parent identification, as boys 
are still mother oriented (at age four) when preferences for objects, ' . 
activities and playmates are already clearly established. 
Masculinity is associated with values of strength, competence and 
power, and for the boy, acquiring this stereotype produces motivation 
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to enact the masculine role. With regard to femininity, even though 
adult females are perceived as less competent and less powerful than 
males, it is still superior to that of a child of either sex. There 
are distinctly feminine values associated with 'niceness'. 
(d) The child has a tendency to perceive his gender role as normative 
and hence generates judgements that conformity is morally right and 
deviations as morally wrong. Kohlberg believes this tendency is 
largely the result of the child's conception of a socio-moral order 
in which each person has his place and in which deviation should be 
punished. Piaget (1947) also describes the child tendency to view 
any deviation from the social order as bad or wrong even if such 
deviation would not be considered bad by adults. Kohlberg goes on 
to postulate that the physical constancies underlying the child 
concepts of gender identity tend to be identified with divine or 
moral law, and the need to adapt to the physical realities of one 
own gender identity are viewed as moral obligations. 
(e) Kohlberg's fifth mechanism is modelling or identification. 
His analysis of the process is strikingly different from the 
psychoanalytic or learning interpretations. Sex-typing is not 
conceived as the product of identification, quite the contrary, 
identification is a consequence of sex-typing. Boys model them-
selves after males because they already have masculine interests 
and values; "for the boy with masculine interests and values, the 
activities of ·a male model are more interesting and hence more 
mode 11 ed "~· (Kohl berg, 1966, p. 134.) 
Kohlberg's interpretation of imitation and identification is 
derived from Piaget's documentation of the "tertiary circular 
response" (Piaget 1952, p. 267) which is a kind of repetitive 
behaviour that engages and fascinates the child, where he repeats 
an action over and over again, not in any stereotyped form, but 
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more like variations on a theme that is deliberately varied. New 
actions spring from this theme, which is one of the familiar schemas 
already well established in the child's repertoire. Extending 
this concept to gender development and imitation and identification 
in particular, Kohlberg sees this process as evolving from the 
circular reaction. 
With regard to the central issue of biological versus cultural 
patterning, Kohlberg's approach to psychosexuality is 'interactional' 
in a special sense. The assumption is made that the basic mental 
structure is the product of the interaction between the organism and 
the environment rather that directly reflecting either innate patterns 
in the organism of patterns of events in the environment. He avoids 
any discussion on the quantitative contributions of biological and 
cultural factors to individual variations in sexual attitudes, 
maintaining that when the.problem is posed in such a fashion, one can 
easily be lead to nothing than piously eclectic 'interactionalism' 
which asserts that all behaviour is affected by both hereditary and 
environmental factors which have little conceptual significance. 
"The critical theoretical issue here is the conception 
of the basic source of patterning in sexual attitudes, 
not the quantitative contribution of the factors that 
may influence or deflect this pattern.in individual 
cases." (Kohlberg, 1966, p. 84.) 
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The necessity to clarify the above issue is important as many 
American psychologists have been peculiarly concerned with individual 
differences rather that developmental universals, and because they 
failed to understand the distinction between behaviour differences 
in general and behaviour structure, they have frequently misinter-
preted European theories of development. Some American writers 
have, for example, misinterpreted Piaget's stages as "maturational" 
in the Gesellian sense, and have thought he claimed intelligence is 
unaffected by environment. Others (like J. Mc V. Hunt, 1961, 1963) 
have correctly interpreted Piaget's stages as being based on the 
assumption of organism-environment interactions but take the 
assumption as indicating that individual differences in intellectual 
performance was less hereditory than was long believed. 
Kohlberg too, is unfortunately misunderstood by some American 
writers, for example Mussen comments: 
"The theory is a descriptive-developmental one and is not 
primarily concerned antecedant-consequent relationships 
in sex-typing. As a result, it gives less adequate 
attention to individual differences in degress of sex-
typing i.e. within sex differences in strength of sex-
typing responses. Kohlberg views these fundamentally 
as the outcome of differences in level or rate of cog-
nitive development. This hardly seems a satisfactory 
explanation however, for in any group of boys of the 
same age and equal intelligence there are wide 
variations in degrees of masculinity of interests, 
attitudes and behaviour." (Mussen 1969, p. 726.) 
A recent comment by Danziger can appropriately be used as a 
reply to Mussen objection: 
"Structural theories are not des_igned to predict indivi-
dual differences in biological or psychological 
function. The most careful microscopic or macroscopic 
description of the anatomical structures involved in 
the fllllction of digestion, for example, will not enable 
us to make any predictions relating individual differ-
ences in anatomy to individual differences in digestive 
function. Similarly, Freud's account which purports 
to describe certain universal functioning in personality 
in general does not logically lead to predictions about 
· individual differences, and it does not seem that Freud 
could ever do so • . . Faced with such considerations 
some investigators have turned to study socialization 
as a process rather than as an effect. Their interests 
have shifted from the products of socialization to its 
mechanisms." (Danziger, 1969, p.28.) 
Another misunderstanding of the ~ognitive structural nature 
of Kohlberg's theory is expressed by Biller and Borstelman (1967) 
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who, in an int_egrative review attempt to isolate factors which are 
presumed to effect masculine development. They see his emphasis on 
'cognitive influences' to be a "rather one-sided view of sex-role 
development". They say, "He seems to assume that knowledge of sex-
role is isomorphic with sex-role development .•. but it does not 
encompass it all." (Biller and Borstelman, 1967, p.279.) 
These critics appear to be using the concept "cognitive 
influence' in a way that associationists talk about only one process 
-- association. Cognitive theorists do not talk of the 1 c.ognitive 
influence• upon the child on the one hand, and then go on to talk of 
the 'sociocultural influences• upon the child on the other hand, and 
then weigh out their relative contribution to the child's development 
-- an approach Biller and Borstelman adopt. 
18. 
THE RESEARCH STRATEGY: Studying the development of children's sex 
role identity in terms of cognitive structural 
stages. 
The research strategy involves foremost, an analysis of the 
development of children's sex-role attitudes and concepts in terms of 
c.ogni ti ve structural stages. In terms of our assumptions above that 
the social-emotional development and functioning are not distinct 
realms, but parallel -- merely representing different perspectives, 
it becomes logically possible to relate the present analysis to the 
stages and structures elaborated by Piaget. 
Piaget charted the growth of the child's thoughts through four 
distinct but chronologically successive modes of inteHigence: 
(i) the sensorimotor (birth to 2 years) 
(ii) preoperational (2-7 years) 
(iii) concrete operational (7-11 years) 
(iv) formal operational (11 onwards). 
In Diagram A, which is a summary of our research formulation, the 
respective cognitive structures relating to gender are depicted in the 
form of 'layers' or stages on the vertical axis, while the horizontal 
axis of the diagram gives an indication of the sequence of stages and 
their correspondence to the periods of operation formulated by Piaget. 
Cognitive stages are hierarchical integrations forming an order of 
increasing differentiation. As the child grows, his cognitive 
organization of the environment changes qualitatively. Our strategy 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sex-role identity of the young child not only differs from the mature 
adult, but how it moves from predominantly lower to higher levels 
of operation. 
A stage and sequence analysis will demonstrate: 
(a) That stages imply qualitative changes in children's modes of 
solving the same problem at different ages. 
(b) That these different modes of thought form an invariant sequence 
or succession in individual development; while cultural factors may 
slow down, stop or speed up development, they do not change its 
sequence. 
(c) Each of these different and sequential modes of thought represent 
a structured whole. 
A given st.age-response on a task does not just represent a 
specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity with a 
particular task or tasks similar to it. Rather it represents an 
underlying thought organization. For example, the interpretation 
of the child's responses to our .'gender class inclusion' procedures 
at a particular stage such as the period of concrete operations, will 
reveal that his understanding that the class of boys and the class 
of men are sub-classes of the category of 'males' is determined by 
the same c.ognitive structure that permits him to grasp intellectually 
that one class can be included in the other, i.e. that two classes 
have the same defining properties, but that the sub-class has 
additional defining characteristics which the class does not have. 
The cognitive developmental approach to sex-role acquision thus 
presupposes a conceptual analysis of structural stages of the 
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following nature: 
(a) An analysis of universal features of experienced events. 
St_ages of physical or social concepts depend on universal structures 
of experience for their shape in addition to invariants of the 
nervous system. An interactional conception of st.ages differs 
from a maturational one in that it assumes that experience is 
necessary for the stages to take the shape they do in addition to 
assum~ng that a richer stimulation will lead to faster advances 
through the stages involved. 
(b) The understanding of cognitive st.ages depends on the logical 
analysis of orderings inherent in given concepts. Since the 
invariants of the sequence in the development of the concept does 
not depend on a prepatterned unfolding of neural, patterns, it 
must depend on a l_ogical analysis of the concept itself. 
(c) Thirdly, an understanding of sequential stages depends on an 
analysis of the relation of the structure of the specific experience 
of the child to the behaviour structure. Such analysis focus on 
discrepancies between the child's action system or expectancies 
and the experienced event, andhypothesise<some moderate or optional 
d_egree of discrepency as constituting the most effective experience 
for structural change in the organism.(employing the concepts 
·1 assimilation' and 'accommodation'). 
In the case of the present study, the rigorous application of the 
above strategy is, in a sense, modified as it is an extension of the 
analysis of stages already documented by Piaget. From a practical 
point of view therefore, the research strategy manifests .itself in 
21. 
the subsequent chapters to the extent of: 
(a) demonstrati.ng the presence of a particular operation and how it 
manifests itself at a particular st.age of gender identity development, 
(b) showing the parallel relationship between operations of a social 
nature and opera~ions of a physical or ntunerical nature as decumented 
by Piaget, 
(c) demonstrati.ng the process through which schemas at one st.age are 
assi~ilated to a previous stage of operation. For example, in terms 
of the principle of the hierarchical integration of stages we find, how, . . 
at the level of concrete operations, the child replaces a physical-
normative mode of cognition in which he used body-size as a basic 
indicator of all important .age statuses with psycho~ogical-normative 
modes: as. the schemas become more differentiated competence is 
associated with 'bei~g clever' rather than 1 bei~g strong'. 
In our experimental investigation we trace a cha.nge from the 
physical to the psychological-normative modes of c.ognition, demon-
strating the influence of body-size on early intuitive gender ascription. 
(See chapter Gender-Size) Then we go on to invest.igate how the child.'·s 
tho.ught gradually becomes freed from defining social and behavioural 
characteristics in terms of physical attributes, and becomes capable 
of establishi.ng properties as invariant in the face of irrelevant 
cha.nges • The child b.egins to cat.egorise part from part. From an 
. egocentric self-babel of 'boy' or .'girl' it is riow possible for him to 
conceive of a class of befogs with common defini.ng properties. 
chapter.Gender-Classification.) 
(See· 
In the chapter Gender Class Inclusion, we discover how the child 
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becomes capable of comparing part to the whole without destroying the 
part as previously. This means that since he sees boys and men as 
subgroups of the class of males and. girls and women as part of the 
class of females, he is now in the position to rec.ognise and define 
the masculine role of his own father in more individualistic terms 
related to the father's particular role definitions. 
Perhaps one of the most interesting discoveries is how gender 
becomes divorced from age and time. (See chapter on.Gender-Age-Time) 
The operations of succession and duration which were previously 
unconnected become co-ordinated, permi tti.ng the child to understand 
that sex-role definition involves an ~ge-role definition. 
operations become stabilised at the 7-8 year level. 
These 
While each of the research chapters focusses on a particular 
operation within the hierarchy and the structures related to it, the 
Gender Identity chapter describes the. gradual stabilisation of the 
child's gender self concept between the .ages of four to eight years 
thro.ugh the application of the Gender Identity ineasure. Here we 
discover how the child is able to consistently maintain a masculine 




This study invest.igating the hierarchy of operations that describe 
sex-role identity as the product of cognitive growth is presented in 
five sections: 
(a) Gender Identity 
(b) Gender Classification 
j (c) Gender-Size 
(d) The Development of Gender Class Inclusion 
(e) Gender-Age-Time 
Each section focusses on relevant aspects of the development and 
functioning of -the child's cognitive structure at a particular st.age. 
In order to define and analyse the nature and ~ignificance of the 
child's underlyi.ng thought organisation, a series of measures were 
des.igned by the author for the purpose. Accordi.ng to Mussen in the 
Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research: (Goslin, Ed., 1969, 
p. 726.) 
"Since the cognitive developmental theory of sex-typing 
was proposed very recently, there have not yet been 
any direct tests of specific hypotheses derived from 
theory and adequate evaluation is not possible ••• " 
A problem that was confronted in planning the execution of the 
research strategy was the absence of any standard measures which could 
be employed. Mussen attributes this to the recency of the theory. 
Consequently the author set about devisi?g instruments that could 
suitably be employed to study the content or structure of the child's 
thought with regard to sex-role. 
·' 
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The respective measures are described in the appropriate sections 
in conjunction with a description of the processes under consideration, 
the rationale and the postulates. Each section also contains a 
description of the problems encountered in devising and applying the 
measures, as well as the treatment of the responses. 
Before each measure was finally administered, it was checked in 
a pilot study for significance and reliability. The nursery school 
and primary school teachers who observed the pilot testi.ng made a 
number of valuable practical suggestions. In most cases alterations 
or modifications were called for before the final administration. 
Postulationsof Invariance 
The nature of the cognitive developmental approach, being a 
study of process rather than cause and effect, demands postulates of 
invariance rather than directional hypotheses. Invariance is one of 
the important concepts in natural science which unfortunately has yet 
to become part of common usage in psycho fogy. It can be said that a 
scientific theory is always, in a sense, a statement of invariance. 
This term is frequently encountered in the writings of Piaget. It is 
of interest to us for two reasons: 
(a) A theory of cognitive development must describe and explain 
the processes whereby children come to understand the invariance of 
properties in their environment, as Pi.aget demonstrated how we.ight, 
for example, does not change if an object is reshaped as long as nothing . . . 
is added or taken away. Similarly we are interested in demonstrating 
hOW all the baSiC proCeSSeS involved in 'physical I C.ognitiOnS are alSO 
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basic to social development. 
Social development involves the restructuring of the concept 
of the self in relationship to concepts of other people, conceived 
as being in a common social world with common standards. 
(b) We are ~qually interested in discoveri_ng invariances in 
the child's thought processes themse Ives. Here, the problem is 1 
how does the child's functioni_ng develop permitti.ng him to transfer 
knowledge from one situation to anoth:er while maintaining a cognitive . . . 
stability that allows him to meet the pressure of the changing . . . 
situation. 
The respective postulates of invariance appear in the appropriate 
chapters relati.ng to the specific c_ognitive operations under 
consideration. 
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METHOD OF ENQUIRY 
The first problem in devising a suitable research strat.egy was 
to select a method of enquiry which was capable of studying the 
aontent or structure of the child's tho.ught. The content of the 
child's thought is particularly difficult to invest.igate as young 
children do not find it easy to commlinicate their tho.ugh ts. The 
invest.igator who wishes to study this field s.hould be aware that 
the young child does not yet use language as a dominant mode of 
communication, therefore, the techniques of elicit~ng data should be 
particularly sensitive. What is equally important is that the , 
examiner himself should be a trained and sensitive observer of 
children. If adequate rapport is not established, or if the child's . 
attention span is surpassed, the data will be unreliable. 
Considerations in choosing an appropriate method 
Careful attention had to be devoted to the choice of an 
appropriate method by we.ighfog the advantages and the disadvant.ages 
of the various alternatives open to us in relation to the research 
requirements. Consideration of the various methods used by Piaget 
as well as the methods used by subsequent investigators in replica-
ting his research was found to be useful. 
In Piaget's early study of infants he employed partly a naturali-
stic and part:lY an,;: informal experimental approach. He patiently 
observed and documented. the behaviour of his own three children as it 
occurred naturally while the child was in the crib or while it was 
at play •. 
27. 
It was a method he had taken over from his previous experience 
in biological science. There was no observer to check the 
reliability of his observations, nor specific instruments or experi-
. mental apparatus. If however, in the course of his observations, 
it appeared that the child could not deal with a certain kind of 
problem, Pfaget would often intervene and impose these obstacles 
on the child and observe the results. This procedure is obviously 
very_different from the usual experimental approach in which the 
child's behaviour or psychological reactions are observed, often with 
special instruments under carefully controlled conditions in the 
laboratory. Yet the procedure suited Pi.aget' s requirements admirably. 
His aim at the ·outset was to explore and to describe. He felt that 
at the initial st.age of research, a 1'.igid testi_ng technique and the 
use of statistics was premature. 
It is indeed true that unlike a controlled experiment which tends 
to focus the attention of the invesUgator on a limited class of 
behaviour, often ma.king it impossible for other kinds of behaviour to 
be noticed; Piaget's keen observation and intimate contact with his 
subjects lead him to discover phenomena that not only were original 
but almost too surprising to be believed. Yet· the drawbacks which 
prevent it from being used by us as an instrument of research are 
numerous.: 
1. It is very time consuming as an examiner may observe a 
ch±°ld for a very long time before anythi.ng of interest 
may be noted. 
2. As he is ~alled to make constant evaluations, the ,, 
examiner must be a highly skilled and attentive 
observer. 
3. Standard statistical tests are not used altho_ugh 
today they are seen as indispensible tools of 
research. 
4. It is more suited for initial exploratory work 
with a small number of children, requiri_ng maxi-
mum flexibility, than for a later phase of research 
when flexibility can be sacrificed for standardiza-
tion. 
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The above method of enquiry is unsuitable for our requirements 
for both practical and theoretical reasons: Theoretically, the cogni-
tive developmental approach is sufficiently well established with 
regard to the documentation·of the successive stages of cognitive and 
the mechanisms operative at these st.ages, to permit us to both narrow 
the focus and adopt a more rigorous methodol_ogy. Practically, the 
naturalistic-observational method is more applicable to the sensory-
motor stage while the youngest of our subjects are four years old --
in the preoperational st.age. At best, naturalistic observation can 
serve only a subsidiary role in that it can s~ggest questions for 
intensive clinical examination, or it can serve as a check on the 
results of clinical testing. 
The Clinical·Method versus the Testing Method 
An evaluation was made regarding the suitability of the testing . . . 
method versus the clinical method insofar as they would suit our 
purposes. 
The testing method is a widely used psychological research 
technique featuri_ng a series of questions which are posed in the 
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same way to all who take the test. It is important that the questions 
be read in precisely the same way to all the children. No flexibility 
at all is permitted, other than repeating the question if the child 
does not understand. The important feature of the method is the 
standardized administration in erder to guarantee that all subjects 
are faced with the same problems. If four year olds_ give one answer 
and 8 year olds another, then the examiner may reasonably conclude 
that there is a real difference between _age groups. 
Replication studies of Piaget's exploratory work by researchers 
such as Elkind (1961) demonstrate the value of a strict testi_ng method. 
The lack of flexibility in procedure, the narrow focus upon a si?gle 
facet of c_ognitive growth are then no longer disadvant_ages, but are 
exploited to gain normative data. 
When it comes to the disaovery of content or 'structural operations', 
then the test~ng method is not suitable for the task -- mainly because 
of the inflexibility of the method. If the chil~ gives an interesting 
reponse the examiner cannot persue it, or if the child's answer 
suggests an additional topic for invest_igation then the examiner must 
leave the matter unexplored. For example,· in our invest_igation of 
children's gender-size concepts some children revealed that they had 
classified one of the two pictures of ~ogs presented to them as female 
on the basis of le_ngth of hair. This was an interesti_ng response and 
was worth persuing. 
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Another disadvantage of the testing method is that the answer the 
child gives may not reveal the spontaneous contents of his thought, but 
may merely be a hastily considered response to a question encountered 
for the first time. In research of our nature when one is investiga-
ting the invarience of certain concepts, it is particularly important 
that the examiner is assured of the stability of the child's response. 
If the child is unsure, further questioni_ng may induce him to cha_nge 
him mind, whereas if the concept is secure the child will consistently 
reveal it. The testi_ng method merely requires an answer without 
indicati_ng whether it is secure or tentative. 
P_iaget tended to avoid a set standardized form of testing, 
preferring a general framework with wide flexibility for questioni_ng 
the child. We can call this the 'Clinical Method'. The basic aim 
of this method is to follow the child's thought without deforming it 
by suggestions, or by imposing the adult's views upon the child. 
Piaget admirably demonstrated how the examiner adopts the language of 
the child and keeps the level of the questions accessible to the child. 
Terms which are beyond his reach are avioded or replaced as much as 
possible by those which the child has spontaneously emitted. If the 
child does not understand then the examiner is free to rephrase the 
question. The answers of the child are formed into an hypothesis 
concerning the nature of the child's beliefj subsequent questions are 
then used to test this hypothesis. 
The delicate nature of the clinical method and the fact that it 
is prone to several kinds of errors hardly makes it a viable alterna-
tive to the testing method. It is easy to see that no two examiners 
31. 
will persue the same line of questioni.ng. Since clinical interviews 
are very unstandardized it is difficult for an independent invest_iga-
tor to test the findings. 
For our purposes the clinical method is deficient. Pi.aget crune 
under heavy fire in that he conunitted a l~rge number of methodol.ogical 
sins; his books only. give portions of selected clinical interviews. 
He fails _to report the number of subjects, their exact .age, social 
ba~kground and their is no statistical sununary. However, P~aget 1 s 
goal was to open up new areas for invest.igation usi.ng methods which 
were as flexible as possible. 
For om ptn'poses, the ideal method of invest.igation would be one 
which would be somewhat midway between the Testi.ng Method and the 
Clinical Method, yet minimising the disadvantages of each. This 
•' . . 
involves find~ng a balance between the attributes of the two methods 
-- we.ighing out concepts which are often mutually exclusive such as 
r.igidity permitti.ng standardization versus flexibility and depth. 
This method, which we shall call the 'Revised Clinical Method' is the 
one that we have adopted. 
The Revised Clinical Method 
This method involves several feattn'es which admirably suit our 
research re~uirements. 
First, where possible it avoids a dependence upon: verbalization 
unlike the traditional clinical method where the exruniner poses the 
question in words and the child is required to give the answers in the 
srune way. The reason for this is that the child might not understand 
.... 
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everything said to him, particularly if the words do not always 
refer to concrete objects. From the child's point of view, even 
if he can understand the examiner, it is very likely that he can 
not adequately express in words the full extent of his knowledge. 
So, whenever possible, the questioning refers to concrete objects 
set before the child. In some instances the child is required 
to make judgements about the materials before him, at other times 
he h required to manipulate them in this way revealing 
{a) whether he understands the problem as set down 
by the examiner, as well as 
CJ:>). providing him with a means to express himself. 
While completely non-vebal tests are desirable, it is often 
hard to invent them. This is particularly true for a study of 
our nature involving abstract concepts or the concept of thought 
as these concepts are not easily manifested in the simple manipu-
lations of concrete objects. The revised clinical method, 
therefore must depend for its data on the child's verbal response. 
But even when this is necessary, the child's answers refer to a 
problem stated in terms of concrete materials which are present. 
For example, the child demonstrates his understandi_ng of gender 
classes by sorting cards depicting boys, girls, men and women into 
their respective classes, i.e. the concept that bovs and men are in 
the same class (males), the child again reveals this understanding 
by working with a concrete representation placed before him. 
The problem of standardized questions versus a flexible . 
enquiry is dealt with by compromising to some extent. All the 
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measures have a d.egree of standardization of administration in that 
the sequence of questions is basically the same for all subjects, 
yet when and if it is required, it is permissible to follow 
through a spontaneous comment py the child which appears fruitful. 
This is documented alo.ngside the standardized enquiry adding 
qualitative information. 
What we have attempted, is a balance between the quantitative 
and qualitative, and flexibility and standardization. The sample 
of children from whom we have acquired data is large, permitting 
us to make a statistical summary of their responses. At the 
same time many of the spontaneous comments and questions from the 
children will be included when describing results. 
In summary the revised clinical method adopted involves: 
1. a minimum of verablization per se; 
2. question and answers refer to concrete 
objects set before the child; 
3. there is a degree of standardization 
for the purpose of statistical documen-
tation of results; 
-4. a certain flexibility is permitted jn 




A total of 125 children made up the sample for the major 
study. The youngest were four years old, and the oldest; eight 
years old at the time of testing. They were divided into five 
. groups accordi.ng to age. 
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The younger subjects of 4 and 5 years of .age were all enrolled 
at two of the three demonstration schools attached to the Barclay 
House Training College for Nursery School Teachers. The 6, 7 
and 8 year old subjects were all enrolled at the Golden · Grove 
Primary School nearby. 
The twelve subjects used in the pilot study were taken from 
the Herschell Road Nursery School, while the older ones wePe 
arranged privately. Their ages ranged from 4 to 10 years. 
Parents Permission 
Parents who enter their children at the demonstration nursery 
schools give permission that their children may be used for 
observational studies by studentteachers as the completing of an 
observational study is required from each student. However, it 
was thought advisable by the headmistress that a special letter be 
drafted and distributed to the parents of the prospective subjects 
·to explain the purpose of the present study, and requiring them to 
give signed permission that their children may be used as subjects. 
This was decided upon as past experience had hown that many parents 
had interpreted a request for their children to be tested as an 
indication that there was somethi.ng wrong with their child. The 
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letter assured parents that this was purely a normative study. 
The headmaster of the primary school, after acquainting him-
self with the nature of the tests, and noti.ng that no real demands 
were being made on the children beyond that which they were 
accustomed to in the normal school routine, decided that no 
purpose would be served in ':'making too much fuss" by informing the 
parents etc., so that the testing conunenced relatively unnoticed. 
Socio-Economic Class 
Admission to the nursery schools is highly desired by parents, 
and made strictly according to waiting lists. The high atten-
dance fees, as·well as the residential addresses of the parents 
indicated that the subjects came from an upper socio-economic 
bracket. Information from the school administration revealed 
that necessity was not a reason given for desiring admission --
almost all parents had their own domestic servants, and those 
mothers that worked did so out of preference. Only two reasons 
were given by parents for desiring admission for their child --
companionship and training. 
The 6, 7 and 8 year old subjects were enrolled at the Primary 
School all lived in the upper middle class neighbourhood (Ronde-
bosch) in which the school was situated. Most of the nursery 
school children move on to this school or others in the same 
neighbourhood. There was thus a certain continuity in residential 
and socio-economic class between the younger and older subjects. 
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Qualifications for Subjects· 
Lists of children to be tested were drawn up in co-operation 
with the teachers who knew the children well, and were able to 
screen them in terms of the qualifications laid down. The only 
requirements were that the child had no incapaci tati_ng emotional 1 
intellectual or physical handicap. It was stressed that the 
child should be able to represent his age group -- "a typical five 
or six year old" -- in order that generalizations could be made. 
These requirements were aHhered to strictly by the nursery school 
teachers. However, there were two six year olds and two seven 
year olds in the primary school sample who manifested definite 
signs of personality disturbances. This was discussed with the 
teachers concerned who had drawn up the lists, who admitted that 
they had included these children in the hope that they could be 
given some advice on handHng them, or in arranging treatment for 
them. These children were removed from the sample. 
The Composition of Age Groups 
Each group contained 25 subjects of a particular age. 13 
girls and 13 boys were initially listed. Absenteeism, refusal, 
or some other reason for the child not being tested generally brought 
the sample down to 25. If the sample was less than 25, then a 
replacement was found. If however, the quota was reached, then 
the final child on the list would be deleted. The ratio of 
girls to boys was as close as possible -- 13 to 12. Table 1 shows 




4 5 6 7 8 
MEASURES M F M F M F M F M F 
Gender Identity Measure 12 13 12 13 12 13 13 12 13 12 
Gender Size Measure 13 12 12 13 12 13 13 12 
Gender Classification Tasks 12 13 12 13 13 12 
Additive Composition Tasks 13 12 13 12 12 13 12 13 
Gender - Age (Time) 12 13 13 12 12 13 12 13 
TABLE 1 The number of boys and girls in each age group and the 
tests they were administered. 
Testing Routine 
A schedule of testing was drawn up to suit the routine of the 
particular school. At the nursery schools, testing began at 9 a.m. 
ending at 12 a.m. Allowance had to be made for the children's 
tea break, lunch, toilet routine, and the rest period. Each child 
was tested individually by one examiner. The average time taken 
to complete the test battery varied between 40 minutes and one 
hour. On occasions it was necessary to break the testing into two 
sessrtons. 
At the primary school, the 6 year olds were tested between 
9 a.m. and 12.50 a.m. when their school day ended, while the 7 and 
8 year o~ds were tested in the afternoons between 12.50 and 2.15 p.m. 
".• 
GENDER IDENTITY 
1he concept of 'gender identity' as generated by the cognitive 
developnental theories (Baldwin 1896, 1905, Pi.aget 1947, Kohlberg, 
1966, 1969) is one that is very different from theories which suggest 
that basic sex-role attitudes are patterned by social reinforcements, 
sexual fantasies and fears, or identification with models. 1he 
alternative conceptualization is that the child's basic. sex-role 
identity is l~gely the result of a self-ca~egorization as male or 
fenale made relatively early in developnent by means of a process of 
intellectual or c.ognitive development, which depends partly on matu-
ration, partly thr~ugh contact with reality, and partly through 
explicit socialization pressures. 
Gender identity seen from this perspective,, is actually a c.ogni-
tive structure that functions to extract and process information from 
the environment (i.e. stimuli), and int.egr.a~e it into a representation 
of the environment in which the individual is himself a part. Such a 
structure then serves, in fact, to determine the effectiveness of 
various stimuli. 
Research on children of kind~rgarten .age (Delucia, 1961; Epstein 
and Leverant, 1963; Stevenson, 1965) demonstrate n~ general effect 
from reinforcement -- either negative or positive. Moreover, mascu-
line and fe.minirte values are not only maintained, but detexmine the 
value of some situational rewards. For example, ~igh masculine scuring 
boys learned more. effectively with reinforcements from a male E. than 
a female E., while low masculine scori.ng boys showed no such 
differences. 
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Kohlbe.rg (1966) refers to gender identity as a "basic cognitive 
categorization of the self". Other authors have recently proposed 
similar concepts such as Aronfreed' s (1969) "c.ogni tive template", or 
Bandura' s (1969) "an image guidi.ng imitation". Freud clearly rec.og ... 
nised the importance of gender identity: The psychoanalytic inter .. 
pre ta ti on anphasises the child's early anatomical uncertainty, with 
emphasis ass.igned to the discovery of differences in the external 
genitalia of nales and females, resulti.ng in the Oedipal Complex with 
castration anxiety in boys, and penis envy in girls. In other words 
genital differences, for Freud, was the basis on which children de ... 
rived their gender identity. 
The cognitive developmental theory however, while recognisi.ng 
the child's early anatomical uncertainty, does not assume the exist .. 
ence of the oedipal situation; the concern about the integrity and 
constancy of his own body is merely part of the child's. general 
cognitive uncertainty at this timeo Gender identity is not the 
result of a sudden and total resolution based o~ genital considerations 
at the age of 6 or 7 years; in fact children remain unclear about the 
genital basis o~ gender identity well after they have clearly accepted 
their own gender identity. (Katcher, 1955) 
According to Kohlbe.rg, 
"Gender identity, i.e. the c.ognitive self-cat.egorization 
as 'boy' or .'girl' is the criticaf ~rganizer of sex-
role attitudes. The 'gender-identity' results from a 
basic, simple cognitive judgement made early in 
development. Once made, this categorization is 
relatively irreversible and is maintained ~n 
spite of the viscisitudes of social reinforce-
ment, parent identification, etc." (1966, p.88) 
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In line with our perspective that. gender identity is a cognitive 
mediator, it is worth clarifying Kohlbe.rg' s statement that. gender 
identity results from a "basic, simple, c.ognitive jll:dgement made 
early in development .•. " This statement may appear somewhat final 
and could be misunderstood to be anal.agous to analytical resolution 
of the oedipal complex. For the cognitive developmental theory 
however, the early judgement or self-labell~ng as 'boy' or .'girl' at 
" about 3 years of .age (Gesell, 1940; Rabban, 1950) is no more than the 
earliest beginni.ng of a cognitive structure. 
As we intend to demonstrate in subsequent chapters; this 'judge-
ment' is of an intuitive and ~gocentric nature which has yet to 
develop. The frame of reference has to broaden, and the concepts 
which are assimilated to the structure have to become stabilized. 
Our thesis is that gender identity, as a cognitive structure, 
develops in the same sequential st.ages, involvi.ng similar operations 
at each st.age, as the operations the child uses to understand his 
'physical' word. We are interested in investigati.ng these stages and 
the level of operations used in the cognitive development of gender 
identity. 
The cognitive developmental approach postulates a vertical hier-
archy of operations in the development of a structure, which means 
that at each age, not only the child's .age-role definitions alter, 
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but the way he perceives his social environment and interprets 
social relationships will differ qualitatively from one st_age to 
the next. For example the loose cluster of physical characteristics 
that the child relies upon to make early sex-typed distinctions, 
s_ignify the level of operations at that st_age, which are very differ-
ent from the later more sophisticated operations that are evidenced 
at say six - seven years. 
. The problem of identifyi_ng and describi.ng the development of 
different processes tha~ go rt:o make up. gender identity is dealt with 
by applyi_ng specific measures which are discussed in subsequent 
chapters. 'Ihese measures are intended to reveal i~ greater depth 
.. 
the operations of the cognitive components of gender identity. In 
this chapter, however, we describe the 'Gender Identity Measure' 
which demonstrates the degree of stability with which children at 
various _ages have acquired with r_egard to their_ gender self-concept, 
so as to provide normative data, to which the findings of subsequent 
measures provide further understandi.ng of the relativeloperations 
involved. 
The Rationale for a Cognitive Gender-Identity 
The rationale that leads us to want to investigate the relative 
'stability' of the postulated structure Gender Identity,- is based 
on Pi_aget' s view that there is a parallelism or a correspondence 
between the ~ognitive verbal and affective aspects of the development 
of a I?eality orientation. Accordi_ng to Pi_aget (1947), the infant is 
from the start motivationally oriented toward contacti.ng, maintaini.ng 
and mastering objects, rather than toward pure tension disch~rge. 
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The child's. gradual increase in reality orientation, his increased 
awareness of the constancy of the existence and identity of objects, 
is a result of basic qualitative changes in motivational processes. 
Research in this direction, (Piaget, 1947; Wallach, 1963; Inhelder 
and Piaget, 1958, 1964) has demonstrated that children below the 
.age of 6 - 7 years do not view physical objects as retain~ng an 
invariable mass, number, we.igh t, le.ngth, etc. when the perceptual 
con~iguration in which the object appears varies. Our contention is 
that. gender identity is a c.ognitive structure, and is arrived at much 
in the same way, and in the same period, as the child arrives at 
other physical constancies. This involves the postulate that there 
are qualitative ch~nges with .age in the child's perception of his 
social world in which he is represented, as there are qualitative 
changes in his perceptions of his 'physical' world. 
In effect what we are saying is: 
(a) Gender identity is· the produat of ~ogni tive. growth, not the 
result of differential reinforcements or parent identifications. 
(b) Gender identity is the organizer of sex-role attitudes and 
values. 
(c) It is the interven~ng mechanism between the stimulus and the 
.response·-- a c:ognitive mechanism -- which serves to extract the 
information from stimuli and integrate it into a cognitive represen-
tation of the environment. 
(d) A stable gender identity represents the equilibrium of a number 
of cognitive. processes. Once established this cat.egorization is 
relatively irreversible and is maintained by basic physical reality 
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j~dgements regardless of/viscissitudes of social reinforcements, 
parent identifications, etc. 
(e) Since gender identity is a cognitive mechanism, it develops 
in parallel s~ages as the stabilization of other physical reality 
concepts of the sort demonstrated by Pi.aget. 
Development of the Gender Identity Measure 
A number of requirements had to be met in developi.ng a measure 
that would successfully assess the extent to which a subject was 
capable of cat.egorizing gender as being irreversible and maintained 
by a cognitive conceptualization despite changes in appearance or 
behaviour. 
Keeping in mind Pi.aget' s classic experiments in which he requir-
ed children to make judgements about the physical properties of 
various objects such as clay, liquids, etc., in which the perceptual 
configurations in which they appeared varied; we similarly required 
some means whereby we could get children to make a judgement about 
gender permanence, and then increasi.ngly vary the perceptual confi-
guration in such a way that the .child's correct responses eventually 
could only be determined by his cognitive conceptualization of the 
irreversibility of gender ass.ignrnent. 
What was required was an instrument which would permit the 
measurement of a movement from the perceptual to the conceptual. 
A survey of the literature revealed that there was no measure 
of this nature available. This is not surprisi.ng as the present 
approach is a radical departure from the conventional approaches 
which either stress the degree of similarity with same-sex adult 
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model as a fwiction of gender identity, alternatively the measuring 
instruments take the form of various psychol.ogical Masculine-Femi-
nine scales which depend on a description of interests and activi-
ties that western culture considers male-female or neutral; the 
degree of conformity to the norm is take to be an index of 'gender 
identity'. 
Before a measure such as the one intended, could be adopted, 
a n~ber of questions had to be dealt with; the most press~ng one 
being, 'what in fact are the cues by which children ass.ign the 
correct sex-label to themselves and others?' Freudian theory 
s.uggests the young child's difficulty in learni.ng the generalized 
differences between the sexes is due to his difficulty in accepting 
that there are. genital differences between himself and those to 
whom he is attached such as his mother. Freud observed that it 
was only in the early school years (7 - 8 years) that the child 
could· resolve these differences and was capable of identifyi.ng with 
the parent with the same anatomical attributes. 1his is supported 
by an early study (Conn and Kanner, 194 7), usi.ng a doll play 
interview technique. Only fifty per cent of children aged four to 
six were aware of genital differences, while 72 per cent of children 
.aged seven to e.ight were, and 86 per cent of children .aged eleven 
to twelve were. 
However, the c.ogni tive developmental theory has it that genital 
uncertainty is only part of the broader anatomical uncertainty for 
the young child. 1here are two early studies on the discrimination 
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of sex differences by young children which provide useful informa-
tion for the development of our gender identity measure -- Brieland 
and Nelson (1951), and Katcher (1955). 
Brieland and Nelson (1951) wanted to determine how accurately 
children could identify the sex of children who were approximately 
their own age, and what factors predominated in such identification. 
'Ihey presented photographs of preschool children to 90 subjects 
between the ages of 2~ and 7 years. Ten photographs in each of five 
categories were presented -- both clothed and nude with sex appro-
priate and inappropriate somatype and hairstyle. 'Ihey found that 
the hairstyle appeared to be the dominant cue in every age group, 
while genitals became increasingly important for older age groups, 
(6 - 7 years). 
Katcher' s (1955) study was similarly interested in discoveri.ng 
whether children were any more aware of genital differences than 
they are of other sex differentiati.ng cues such as hair, breasts, 
clothing, manners, urinary posture, and how accurately you.ng 
children could identify these differences. A series of coloured 
pictures depicting nude and clothed children and adults in similar 
poses were presented in s.egmented form. The subjects assembled the 
segments of the pictures and determined the sex of the figures by 
hair, clothes, breasts, and external. genitalia. 
The findi.ngs were that few errors were made by children over 
three years in assembling and identifying the clothed figures. 
In contrast children aged 3 to 6 years made many more errors in 
identifying the gender of the genital sections and matchi.ng it with 
the hair and trunk sections of the wiclothed figures. Some errors 
in genital assignment were made by 88 per cent of the three year 
olds, 69 per cent of the four year olds and 31 per cent of the 6 
year olds. 
When the findings of these two studies, Brieland and Nelson, 
and Katcher, are considered together, it appears that children 
rely predominantly on clothing and hairstyle as sex differentia-
ting cues. It is not until the age 6 - 7 that they become aware 
that genital differences determine genders. Subsequently, our 
own measure was devised such that a fully clothed boy with short 
hair would be used to elicit responses about the male gender, and 
a girl with long hair and a dress to elicit responses about the 
female gender.·. Further, in order to determine the degree of 
constancy to which children of various ages attribute to gender 
assignment, the measure was developed so that the masculine de-
fining cues could be successively altered by introducing feminine 
perceptual cues, until finally the male figure 'appears to be a 
female. 1his idea was derived from Kohlberg (1966) who asked 
children whether a girl could be a boy if she wanted to, if she 
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wore boys' clothing and hairstyle. The feature of this then, that 
the subject is required to make a number of judgements about the 
constancy of gender ass_ignment in the face of an increasingly 
changing perceptual configuration. Correct responses to the final 
question about the figure when for all intents and purposes it Zooks 
like a girl, can only be maintained by a cognitive construct, which 
we interpret as evidence of the invariance of gender identity. 
Description of the Measure 
The measure consists of a coloured cut-out drawi.ng of a clothed 
" 
boy 6 cm high, a cut-out dress which can be superimposed over the_ 
boy 1 s clothes, and cut-out. girl 1 s shoulder length hair which can 
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be fitted over the boy's hairo There is also a larger card with a 
drawing of a number of girls playing; a blank space in the centre 
of the picture is provided where the fully dressed .'girl-figure' 
is placedo 
Administration 
s. is presented with a picture of a clothed boy and asked the 
following: 
(1) Give the child a nameo 
(2) Is it a boy or a girl1 
(3) Could he be a real girl if he wanted to be? 
(4) Could he be a real gii-1 if we put. girls clothes on 
him, or would he just be dressi~g up as a girl? 
(E placed cut-out dress over boys clothes.) 
(S) Could he be a real girl if we let him have a girl 1 s 
hairstyle? (Leaving dress on, E. p<laces cut-out 
girls hairstyle over boys hair.) 
(6) Could he be a real girl if he played girls'. games with 
the girls? (E. placed the figure with long hair and . . 
dress, onto a background picture of girls playi.ng.) 
Scoring 
After introduci.ng the cut-out figure to the child and orienting the 
child to the measure by asking him to give the male figure a name, the 
responses are. scored from item 2 to item 6 on an all or none basis. 
Each item correctly answered is cored one point. 
Range 
The range of scores on the GoI.M. is from zero, when the child 
'·. :i' 
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fails even to identify the figure, to a score of S, when the child 
reveals a consistent cat.egorization of gender despite perceptual 
alterations in the test figureo The test items are graded in such 
a way that it should not be possible to score a zero on any item and 
gain a score on a subsequent item. 
1he Preliminary Study 
An initial.draft of the G.I.M. was administered to 12 children 
between the ages of 4 and 10 years. 1he purpose was to ascertain 
whether the wording, and the sequence of questions were appropriate 
as well as whether any alterations or modifications in the presenta-
tion of the figure was called for. 
A valuable su.ggestion was made by the teachers at the nursery 
school where the pilot study was carried out, after sitting in on 
some of the sessions. After iistening to a number of four and five 
year olds responses to the question, "Could he be a girl if he wanted 
to?" and "Could he be a girl if we put girls' clothes on him?" which 
the child in each case said was possible (referring to the cut-out 
figure). 1hey felt that the child's response to the question 
relating to the figure were governed by the child's tendency to fanta-
sise. This objection assumed that the child would give a different 
answer for a 'play-play cut-out figure 1 than if he was asked about 
a reaZ person. To remove this objection the question was put as 
follows: "Could he be a reaZ girl if he wanted to?" adding, "and 
not just a play-play girl, which is just dressi.ng up." 
A further c~eck was made by asking the subject the same question 
both directly and projectively, i.e. "Could you become a real girl if 
you wore girls' clothes and grew your hair long and had a girl's 
hairstyle?" In each case the;same response was obtained. 
Table 2: The Gender IdentityMeasu;-e 
N Age GrouE Mean · S.D. 
25 4 years 1.96 1. 30639 
25 5 years 2.52 1.32665 
25 6 years 3.36 1.65529 
25 7 years 4.16 1.02794 
25 8 years 4.92 • 399998 
Anova Summary: 
Source s.s. D.F. M.S. F Ratio 
Age Group 143.408 4 35. 8521 24.1482 
Error 178.16 120 1.48467 
F = 24.1482, df = 4, 120, p ( .01 
.• , •. ,,.1111 
In order to make a comparison between the projective measure 
and a direct approach in testing young children, all the four and 
five year olds in the major study were also asked the question 
directly o 
Treatment of Responses 
The results of the children's performance on the Gender 
so. 
Identity Measure appear in Table 2. The one way analysis of variance 
(1 way anova) was the statistical procedure employed in order to 
investigate the significance of the developmental trends between the 
.ages of four and eight years in relation to the invariance of the 
gender self concept in spite of perceptual changes in the test figure. 
Discussion of Results 
The null hypothesis tested by the simple analysis of variance 
is that there is not significant difference between the mean square 
of scores between .age. groups and the mean square of scores within 
each _age groupo 
F = 24.1482 df = 3, 90 p.{ 0.01 
The null hypothesis is rejected. There is a s.ignificant difference 
in the means of the five sample age groups. (See Table 2) 
A further treatment was added to the research design, the 
multiple comparison of meanso The mean of the four year old sample 
was compared to the five year olds, the five year olds with the six 
year olds, the six year olds with the seven year olds and the seven 
year olds with the eight year olds. 
The purpos~ of comparing the means between _age groups was to 
discover whether there were any significantly large departures from 
the orderly progression in the cognitive development of the gender 
Mean Scores 




Age Groups 4 yrs 
X ::: .lo96 
~ .... 
5 yrs 
-.X = 2.52 
6 yrs 
x = 3,36 
Figure 1: GENDER IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT. 
age groups on the Gender Identity Measure. 
7 yrs 
x = 4.16 
8 yrs 
x = 4.92 
The means of t.he :five sample 
into a girl, yet they feel that it is i.mlikely that he would want 
to change. 
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Anna Marie (4:11) says, "Yes, but I don't want to ••• I wouldn't 
like to play boy's games. The shorts I wear aren't boy's shorts, 
you know. They have buttons on. There's no belt like on boy's 
shorts.'' 
Caroline ( 4: 2) "He could ••• but it 1 s not nice to be a boy because 
boys don't have pretty curly hair. I like my curly hair. I also 
wear pretty dresses. It would be so much trouble for Mummy to buy 
me all new boys' clothes anyway!" she said defiantly. 
Joanne (4:9) says, "Yes ••• but I don't want to be a boy. I want to 
stay a real girl because girls have nicer clothes and dresses. 
have nicer games than boys ••• " 
Girls 
The mean of the five year old sample is 2.52. It appears that 
the five year old conserves the identity of the figure up to a point 
where the dress is placed over the boy's clothes. 
changes result in the child falling into error. 
Further perceptual 
Children of 4 and 5 who rely.on their perceptual intuitions 
adjust their reasoning to suit their intuitions. Children who 
describe gender as changing as clothing is cha_nged, also believe that 
it can just as easily be changed back again. 
Jennifer (5:5) believes this is possible, ''Yes, if I cut my hair and 
put on boy's clothes I would be a boy." 
E.: "An if you took it all off again (demonstrating on the figure.) 
Jennifer: Then I would be a girl with short hair (laughs) just 
like Nicolette!" 
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Neill (4:2) with a score of 1, names the figure 'Peter'. 
E: Could he be ~ girl if he wanted to be1 
Neill: Yes, ·Only if we change his name to Jane. 
E: Why? 
Neill: That's my sister's name. 
E: Could he be a girl if we put girl's clothes on him? (placi_ng 
cut-out dress on figure) 
Neill: Yes. Yeso Now he is a girl for sure. 
E. Can she change back to a boy _again? (removing clothes) 
Neill: Yes. Now he is a boy again. 
The mean of the 6 year olds is 3.36. 44 per cent of the six year 
olds obtain a full score compared to 16 per cent of the five year olds, 
and 52 per cent of·the seven year olds. It appears that at six years 
of _age the child b_egins to move away from egocentric intuitions to 
logical structures in maintaining the permanence of gendero 
Increasingly children become aware of ascription as permanent 
from birth. They simply say, "I was born a boy." 
Howard (6: 4): "At the Ki_ngsbury (Nursing Home) they make you a boy, 
where mommies go to have their babies. Your mommy doesn't know what 
is coming -- then suddenly it comes out as a boy or_ girl." 
E. to Daniel (6:0) "Could he grow up to be a girl?" 
Daniel: He would look like a man and they would laugh\ if he had a 
dress. It's funny then." 
It is interesti_J?,g to relate our findings that it is at the seven-e_ight 
year level (x = 4.16 and 4.92 respectively) when the child acquires 
cognitive independence from the changing perceptual configuration of 
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the gender figure with the following considerations: 
(a) According to Piaget, this is the period the child moves from the 
stage of articulated intuitions to fully reversible operations. 
(b) According to Freud, it is the period the child resolves his 
wishes and fears (primary processes) and identifies with the 
same-sex parent. 
(c) According to Kohlberg (1966), at this age the child is capable 
of relating his particular role definition in individualistic 
terms to his father's role definition. 
At the 7-8 year level mahy of the children in our sample explained 
that dressing up as a girl is just a disguise. 
Phillip:(7:3): "it's just a boy with a disguise on. 
that off he would still be a boy. 
E: "What makes you a boy?" 
Phillip: The way you are born. 
If you took 
Also Steven (6: 7): "No. You are still a boy. He's just 
tricking (referring to the figure). If he dresses up he can play with 
girls to trick them." 
E: "If you grew your hair long and wear a dress could you become a 
girl?" 
Steven: No. 
Between the ages of four and eight years, the responses to the 
Gender Identity Measure reveals that their are structural changes in 
the mode of the child's thought in his understanding of the invariance 
of gender identity. 
The responses of. children between four and e.ight years of age 
on the Gender Identity Measure, demonstrate the degree of invariance 
that children at these ages have acquired the regard to their gender 
self concept. 
·The responses of the four year olds support the cognitive 
developmental theory that gender identity begins with an egocentric 
intuitive judgement or labelling of 1boy 1 or 'girl'. This judgement 
is no·.more than the earliest l;Ieginni_ng of a cognitive structureo 
We find that the five year olds still rely on this intuitive 
judgement. As the perceptual cues are altered in the male test 
figure cif the G. I. M. giving the male the appearance of a female, 
these children believe that it is possible for a boy to become a girl 
but that the boy would not want to change. 
It is only at the 6-7 year level that we observe children b_eginning 
to rely on logical operations in maintaini_ng the invariance of the 
gender figure. The perceptual changes of the figure no longer . . . 
dominate their thinking. Analogeous to Pi_aget 1 s classic conservation 
of clay experiment in which the mass is understood to be constant in 
spite of changes in its perceptual configuration, these children 
describe gender as unchangeable in spite of changes in its clothing. 
"He is just dressing up as a girl. He can't change in to a gir 1," they 
insist. Here we have evidence of invariance in the child's thinking 
supported by 'reversible operations' in thinking. 
By the age of 8 years 96 per cent of the sample tested obtain 
a full score on the measure revealing that reversible operations are 
well establishe~ by this age. 
Summary 
This chapter introduces the concept of ·1 gender identity' as 
generated by the cognitive developmental approach, i.e. that the 
child's basic sex-role identity is largely the result of a self-
categorization as male or female made relatively early in develop-
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ment (2 - 3 years). Subsequently the intuitive self categorization 
broadens and becomes operationally stabilised as the cognitive 
structure develops. 
A Gender Identity Measure is developed by the author to investi-
gate the stages of development and the d_egree of constancy which 
children between 4 - 8 years of _age attribute to_ gender ass_ignment. 
This measure is intended to· be re lated to the more detailed inmest_iga-
tion of the underlyi_ng cognitive processes at each stage of develop-
ment presented in the subsequent chapters. 
The theme that emerges is that_ gender identity as a cognitive 
construct passes through a vertical hierarchy of operations which 
means that at each age, not only does the child 1 s .age-role defini-
tions alter, but also the way he prrceives his social environment 
and interprets his social relationships differ qualitatively from 
one stage to the next. 
The performance of 125 children on the Gender Identity Measure 
is statistically treated and graphically represented, revealing age 
related stages of development in the child 1 s social work analagous 
to Piaget's classic experiments of conservation in the physical 
world. 
GENDER ASCRIPTION 
In this section our interest is focussed on the origins of 
some of the earliest social distinctions made by children with 
particular attention to the formation of gender distinctions. 
lhis chapter is intended primarily to demonstrate the presence of 
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such distinctions, their early structure, and their function, while 
later chapters will trace the developmental stages thro_ugh which 
these early intuitions become freed from their physicalistic or_igins. 
The congnitive developmental theory postulates that the earliest 
social distinctions of the you_ng child are derived from judgements of 
size. For example, three and four year-olds readily disti_nguish 
between "bi_gge:t than" and "smaller than", ;particularly in referri_ng 
to concrete objects. 
In our discussion with children we observed that they would 
often make statements about relative size such as, "My daddy's got 
big, big shoes. I've got a small shoes", or "I've got a big doll. 
My :sister has only got a small one." Later they are able to say 
"My bike is bigger than Paul's bike". 
Some indication of the way social distinctions become assimilated 
to physical distinctions is revealed in the followi_ng statement by a 
four year old, "I've_ got a small bed because I am small. My brother's 
got a big bed like daddfoecause he is_ grown up". E. "What about your 
little sister?" "Oh, she's only a baby, she doen't sleep in a bed 
yet." 
According to Kohlbe_rg, the earliest social distinctions made by 
young children is .that of .age-size,..babies, children and_ grown-ups. In 
our observations we also noticed how readily children of four and five 
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used size-based concepts to describe incidents, in preference to 
alternative descriptive concepts, for example: 
E; "Which boy pushed you over?" 
S: "The big one". 
E: "ls that why she is crying?" 
S:"Yes, she's a baby." 
The cognitive developmental approach interprets the young 
child's dependence upon physical . attributes at this stage as 
due to the contrete nature of his. tho.ught. Social and behavioural 
attributes are defined in body terms. These distinctions are merely 
intuitive as the child at the preconceptual level is not yet capable 
) 
of .'grouping' i.e. performing certain sets of intellectual actions 
with a set of elements which have relations with one another. 
Postulates: 
Until the young child is capable of .'group~ng', social and be-
havioural attributes are intuitively defined in body terms. By means 
of 'primary circular reactions' the child at the preconceptual stage 
uses ready made schem~s derived from his sensori-motor experience to 
interpret new social realities, consequently: 
(Pl) The child's physical,. -norrmtive modes of cognition Zeads 
him to use body-size as a basic indicator of alZ the important 
age-stage differences, e.g. differences in strength, in know-
Zedge, in social power and self conti'o'l. · 
(P2) Body-size is the intuitive basis of gender asoriptidn: rrv,'les 
are perceived as bigger and stronger than fema'les, just as 
adults are perceived as bigger and stronger chi'ld:r.>en. 
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(P3) Sinae sex-roZe differentiation usuaZZy follows age-role 
differentiation and is also size Zinked, it tends to take 





Males are perceived as bi.gger 
and stro.nger than females, just 




Physical strength ~ 
physical power ~ social 
power • 
..--------.)"Rate of growth is anafogous to rate of 
AGE-SIZE I . ....__ ___ __. .agei.ng -- remains undifferentiated 
until .age 6 - 7. 
By means of .'primary circular reactions' the child at the 
preconceptual stage uses ready made schemas derived from 
from his senory-motor experience to interepret new social 
realities. 
The postulated sequence in which size concepts become 
differentiated as they are applied to the psychologic~-normative 
aspects of social behaviour. 
The Change from Physicalistic to Psychological-Normative Modes 
The cognitive developmental point of view holds three important 
notions: 
(a) the vertical hierarchy of operations; 
(b) the continuous interaction with the environment; 
(c) the competence strivings of the child 
through which the ch~nge from physicalistic to psychofogical-normative 
modes .are effected. 
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The child at the preconceptual level begins to reconstruct all 
that has developed at the sensory-motor level, but this time at the 
level of representational thought, facilitated by the use of langu_age. 
But as yet there are no operations, i.e. -- no conservation. The 
continuous interaction witrfhe environment introduces the child to 
situations of a social nature in which the child is required to make 
distinctions, as for example, between old and young and also to apply 
differential values, and to rec_ognise differences in capacity --
strong, weak, etc. 
The child at the preconceptual st.age uses ready made schemas 
derived from his sensori-motor experience to interpret these social 
realities. By means of 'primary circular reactions' he co-ordinates 
motor habits and perceptions. This kind of assimilation extends the 
breadth and mobility of the schema. The existi.ng physical content of 
the schema is gradually extended and applied to the psychological 
normative aspects of social behaviour. Once a circular reaction is 
established it may be used in a modified form when the child encounters 
situations of a nature that is sufficiently close to elicit the schema. 
Generalizing assimilation however, involves more than making use 
of an old response to a situation that resembled the on~ to which the 
response was o~iginally learned; the schema changes slightly to the 
new demands (accomodation). 
Finally, the schema exists in a number of forms each adapted to 
a particular circumstances. The child's use of size concepts at the 
preconceptual level involves the use of new schema which resemble one 
another closely as. they are all derived from the same or_iginal schema. 
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They are applied to bring about the same result to a variety of con-
cepts. As different demands are placed on them they become increas-
ingly differentiated. 
It is necessary for us to consider the motivation that generates 
change from the physical · . to the psychol.ogicai.-normative modes of 
thinking about social concepts. For Pi.aget, the child's motivation 
takes the form of c.ognitive structur~.ng of the self and the world 
around him: the assimilation of the interesti.ng, masteri.ng and extend-
i.ng control over events, and strivi_ng to be competent. In other words, 
motivation is the child's striving towards independence. 
Kohlberg maintains that with r.egard to the c.ognitive basis of 
sex-role attitudes., "the motivational aspects of sex-role development 
are best understood in terms of a theory of the self and identification 
that rests on general competence, effectance (White, 1959) and self . . 
regard motives rather than infantile sexual drives or attachment and 
dependency motivation, unique to the early parent child relationship 
" (1966, p.88.) The movement from the physical to the psycho-
logical-normative modes is determined by this competence ef fectance 
motivation. 
The child below the age of five years uses the same schema for 
_age and size (Piaget 1969, p.201) .• For him,the .age status of an indi-
vidual is defined in terms of his own physical size and stre_ngth. 
From his own experience physically .'growi_ng up' i.e. _'growing b_igger' 
means becoming stronger, more powerful and more competent. Bei_ng 
small means be~ng a baby -- the most helpless and least competent of 
all categories. 
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By about 6 - 7 years the child b.egins to distinguish between the 
physical and psychological attributes of competence as the schemas 
become more differentiated: competence becomes associated with 'being 
clever' rather than 'being strong'~ 'knowing how to do things right' 
and 'understandi.ng thi.ngs' rather than being physically powerful. In 
this way a psychological normativ~ standard of role behaviour becomes 
established to define the appropriateness of various behaviours. 
The child of four or five years equates the relative differences 
in competence between males and females with differences in age-size. 
Males are b.igger and stronger than children. (In this respect some 
interesting observations are reported in the chapter on gender-age.) 
The Purpose of the Present Section 
In this section we intend to: 
(a) Investigate experimentally the process through which young 
children intuitively rely on size concepts to make gender distinctions. 
(b) Provide a basis for subsequent chapters on gender-age and sex-role 
stereotypes in which the sequence of st.ages in the change from physica-
listic to psychol.ogical-normative modes are traced. 
(c) Provide experimental support for the cognitive developmental 
postulates that: 
(Pl) For young ahiZdx>en.size beaomes a basia indiaator of aZZ the 
important age-status differenaes, e.g. differenaes in strength, in 
knowledge, in soaiaZ power and seZf aontroZj·and 
(P2) Body size is the intuitive basis of gender asaription: males 
are peraeived as bigger and stronger than females, just as adults 
are peraeived as bigger and stronger than ahilib.>en. 
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The Measure 
In order to invest_igate gender-size concepts it was necessary 
to develop a relatively simples measure that would avoid attributes 
such as clothing or hairstyle which have already been found to facili-
tate gender distinctions at a young ~ge, (Katcher, 1955) and also to 
avoid stereotyped responses from subjects. For this reason, it was 
decided that a test of a projective nature usi_ng animals would be 
most suitable, the assumption bei_ng that if children do rely on size 
concepts in disti_nguishi_ng between the different attributes of males 
. as the cogn,itive developmental theory would lead us to believe, 
then an analysis of children 1 s responses to questions referri_ng to 
drawi_ngs of two d_ogs would provide such information. 
Administration 
Two cards 8 cm by 11 cm with styalised ink drawi_ngs of a l<l;l'ge 
dog (7 cm) on one card and a small d_og (2 cm) on the other card, are 
presented to the subject with the followi_ng instructions: 
E: Here are drawi_ngs of the two d_ogs I saw si tti_ng in the street. 
Are they the same kind? How are they different? (S specifies). 
Right, they are two completely different types of d_ogs. One is 
b_ig, has pointed ears and short hair, and the other is small with · 
long hair and lo_ng ears. They are not alike at all. Now I would 
like you to tell me, simply looki_ng at these drawi_ngs, which dog 
is the girl d_og, and which is the boy ~og? 
All of the S's responses are recorded. for example, S: "Did 
you draw them? You drew them different. The one is a b_ig one. It's 
the strong one. My daddy plays r_ugby -- he's the stro_ngest." 
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E: (Referring to the pictures again.) Which one is the girl-d.og 
and which one is the boy-dog? 
S. That one is the boy-dog -- he looks b.igger (pointing). 
E: And the girl-dog? 
S: That one: (pointing to the smaller dog). 
E: Can you be sure you are right? 
S: Yes! the b.ig one is stronger. 
E: How can you tell if it is a boy or a girl? 
S: I just know! 
Subjects 
The Gender-Size Measure was administered to the four year old 
sample. (N = 25.) 
Suitability of Measure 
The test was administered to 12 subjects between the ages of 
4 and 8 years to determine the suitability of the measure: to see 
what extent the dog drawings readily elicited size based responses, 
and to establish a standard sequence of questions. It was found that 
in addition to the questions -- about the two d.ogs of different size 
a further enquiry in the form of an open ended question was found 
useful: 
"If you saw a dog in the street, how would you tell if it was a 
boy or a girl dog?" 
Treatment of Responses to Gender Size Measure 
In order to demonstrate the postulate that the very early 
differentiati<?ns made by children are.·related to intuitive judgements 
based on physical size, the responses of the four year old children from 
our sample who maintain that the la.rge d.og is a male or female respect 
respectively in the absence of further differentiationg cues was 
statistically analysed by the chi-square for its s.ignificance. (See 
Table 3: The number of 4 year olds who maintain that the larger 
dog is a male or female respectively 
4 Year Olds 
Large dog: observed Large d_og: expected 
Male 23.0 12.5 
Female 0.2 12.5 
2 
x = 17.64, df = 1, p < .005 
AGE: 4 5 6 7 
% % % % 
TYPE: i) 43 50 47 27 
ii) 8 3 15 8 
iii) 24 28 15 15 
iv) 22 12 18 17 
v) 3 7 5 33 
Table 4: Scalo~ram: The relative per cent of responses in each 
cat_egory for each :age group. 




x = 17.64, df = 1, p . ( oOOS 
66. 
The null, hypothesis is rejected. The sampi~ deviates h_ighly signifi-
cantly from the hypothesised uniform distribution. The data appears to 
support the postulate regarding young children 1 s early gender differen-
tiation being an intuitive judgement based on physical size. According 
to Table 3, 92 per cent of the four year old sample maintained that the 
larger dog was a male and the smaller dog was a female. 
Responses to the 0pen Ended Question 
In order to invest_igp.te the qualitative nature of young children's 
intuitive judgements in making gender distinctions, a further enquiry 
was made in the form of an open ended question: 
'~If you saw a dog in the street,, how would you tell if it was 
a boy or a girl dog?" 
All children between 4 and 7 year making up our sample (N~lOO) were 
asked this question. · A .. wide variety of responses were obtained. 
These were grouped into the following five types: 
(1) Size: "The bigger dog is always the boy dog." 
(2) Projeated traits derived from size intuitions: "The one that 
fights a lot is the boy dog", and conversely,, "The 'nicer 1 or 
'happier' dog is the_ girl dog." 
(3) Appearance other than size: "The fluffy dog ••• " or "The dog 
with the .. lighter colour is the female." 
( 4) Recognising ascription without necessari'ly understanding the 
basis of such: "from the name ••• " "My mother would te 11 me." 
(5) Genita'ls: "You cap te 11 if you look underneath." 
Examples of the statement of each type are presented below providing 
interesting and sometimes surprising information about children's reasoning. 
I 
Type 1. -Sized-Based Responses 
Most of the type 1 answers were similar to Carol (7:4), "Boy 
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dogs look bigger and stronger: Girl dogs are weaker and smaller.": 
Charles (4:8), "Girl dogs aren't as big and strong as boy dogs. My 
daddy plays rugby, and he.is the strongest." Stuart (4:9), "If it is 
big, I would say it is a boy. Our dog is a b.ig one but its a girl." 
It is interestfog to see how children use other loosely held 
intuitions in addition to size, yet size appears to be the defini.ng 
feature. Steven (6:4), "If it's. got long hair, its a. girl. If it is 
bigger it's a boy." Jason (6:1) referring to the drawi.ngs, "I am sure 
that one's a boy. It looks stronger. It looks fat and big." In the 
open ended question he was emphatic that, "If it is a girl, it looks 
like a girl,· and if it is a boy it looks like a boy." 
Type 2. Projected Traits derived from size-based intuitions. 
Lindsay (4:3), "You can tell a d.og if it is a boy dog -- they are 
the ones that bark a lot, are b.ig and fight a lot." Karen (7:8), "If 
I saw dogs in the street -- if one was fierce it would be a boy d.og. 
The other one (the female) would be 'nice'. Boy d.ogs are fierce." 
Richard (7: 8), "I can tell; if they had a ~ight the strongest would 
be a boy." Tania (6:4), "You can see by their face ... the girl has 
a nicer face." 
Type 3. Appearance other than Size. 
Hair appears to be a prominant determinant for differentiation. 
Rob (7:5), "See if it's hair is all messed up and rough ..• then it's 
a boy." Jennifer (5:8), "I would look at the hair. If it had long 
hair, it's a. girl. A big dog could be a boy or a girl -- but a boy 
dog would have short hair." Adrian (5:9), "If it had short hair it 
would be a boy." Paula (4:11), "The one with lots of fluff would be 
the girl." Adele (7: 1) , "You can look at their faces. One has 
whiskers (the boy), the other one hasn't." 
68. 
Children also use colour: Gary (6:1), "You can tell by the 
colour. The boy is darker." Stuart (5:10), "My mummy told me -- I 
would have known anyway -- mother dogs are mostly white." Nicola 
(4:3), "The black one is a boy and the blacky-white one is a girl. 
The gir 1 is smal 1." 
Type 4. Recognition of Ascription without necessarily understandi_ng 
the basis of such. 
Jacques (6;5) asked what their names were. When E told him he 
said he did not know their names, he refused to conunit himself as, 
"It is difficult to tell if you don't know their names." Martin 
(6:2), "I would ask what its name was. If no one was there, I don't 
know. I real iy don't know - - maybe the name wi 11 be on the collar." 
Lucinda (5:4) also recognises ascription by name as a way of defin~ng 
sex, but is not sure how she would discover the d_og' s name. "I don't 
know what I would do. We have a tortoise we found. We didn't know 
if it was a boy or a girl. We called it 'Petite'. Is that a girl's 
name?" Ben (4:4) said he would simply ask a policeman whose dog it 
is, in order to find out. Kevin (7 :4}, "I would ask somebody what 
its name was." Russel (7:4) in spite of judging the large dog as a 
boy, is beginning to believe that there must be some other form of 
ascription, yet he is still not sure. "I would start traci_ng out 
families. I would ask lots of people. 11 E: "Could you tell by look-
ing at the dog?" "I don't know, my friends always pick up a dog and 
say, this is ·a girl or a boy. You can't always tell though." 
It is interesti_ng how in spite of enl_ightenment about reproduc-





(7: 1), "I would tell by looks -- I would wait a year or so, and see 
which one gets.puppies. The one that gets puppies is the gir 1." 
E: "Isn't there a quicker way?" "Oh yes, the collar has a name on 
it. I would tell by the collar." 
TlJ?e 5. Recognising Genitals as a Means of Ascriptions 
Heather (7: 1), "You can tell by its tail. Boys have_ got like 
a baloon under it. Girls haven't." Rob (7: 5), "The boy d_og cocks 
its legs, the girl doesn't·0 11 Roger (7:7), "Watch what it does how 
does it weeo A boy dog would wee differently." Dain (7: 11), 
"See the way it cocks its legs when it wees." Kevin (7: 5), "I would 
try to discover its name'.' (recognising ascriptions), eventually he 
states, "I would see the way it wees." 
Simon (7: 2), "You look underneath at the 'wee'. If it is low 
it is a boy dog, if it is high it is a girl dog. 11 Dianne (7: 7) 
would commit herself no further than, "I would look close at ito I 
would look at its tail." Corrie (7:7), "I would look underneath." 
""' •r;, 
Vibike (5:6), "I would look tmderneath -- if he has got a pis then he 
Categorization into Stages 
The relative percentage of all responses to the open ended question 
which fell into the five types were summarized in a scalogram. Each 
response was treated as a percentage of the total responses in each age 
group. 
Through examination of the percentage data in the scalogram it 
appears that the answer to the open ended question could be cat_egorized 
into three developmental states. It interested us to note that the 
size based type 1 respon~es predominated for 4, 5 and 6 years of .age 






The number of children's responses within each age 
group.falling into three developmental stages. 
STAGE 1 STAGE 2 STAGE 3 
observed expected observed expected observed expected 
14 12. 75 10 6.5 1 5. 75 
16 12.75 6 6.5 3 5.75 
16 12. 75 5 6.5 4 5.75 
5 12. 75 5 6.5 15 5. 75 
Table of Chi-Sgaures 
' .122549 1.88462 3.92391 
• 828431 .0384615 1. 31522 
• 828431 • 346154 .532609 
4. 71078 .346154 14.8804 
Overall 
2 
x = 29. 7578, df = 6, p( .005 
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(43, 50 and 47 per cent respectively), while at 7 years there is a 
sudden drop in size based responses (27 per cent), and an increase in 
responses recognizi_ng ascription based on genital differences. 
In terms of our rationale the following three developmental stages 
were postulated: 
Stage 1: revealing size-based intuition. 
Stage 2: which implies a recognition of ascription without under-
standing the reason for such. There is usually an appeal for adult 
informationo "I would ask my mother she would know its name", or 
"I would ask a policeman". Children at stage two are aware that 
gender differences are ascribed from birth, yet because of their own 
uncertainty they are reluctant to make the distinction themselves. 
Stage 3: children at this stage are confident about how to_ go about 
making gender distinctions themselves. They realize that not only 
is ascription something that exists from birth, but that the ascrip-
tion is determined by observable genital differences between males 
and females. 
Statistical Treatment of Categorized ResEonses 
The number of responses from each _age group falling into each 
of the three stages are presented in Table 5. In order to investi-
gate the significance of the pattern of frequencies of stage related 
responses across _age groups the data was subjected to a chi-square 
analysis. The null hypothesis tested is that the pattern of observed 
frequencies across age groups does not depart significantly from the 
expected. 
The overall chi-square = 29. 7578, df = 6, p { .005 
The null hypothesis is rejected. There is a s_ignificant difference 
in the pattern of stage related responses across age_ groups. 
From the table of individual chi-squares we observe that there 
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are certain chi-square values which are greater than others 0 Although 
nothing can be stated on the basis of the chi-square analysis regarding 
the relative significance of these values, it will be useful to comment 
on these individual chi-square values for the Hght they cast on 
developmental trends. 
Developmental Trends in Stages 
Looking at the table of chi-squares from Table 5, we observe that 
the value of 1408804 is notably higher than any of the. other values in 
the table. The next highest value is 4.71078. Both these values 
occur within the seven year old sample. The former corresponds to 
the frequency of 15 in stage 3; the latter to the frequency of 5 in 
stage 1 o Taken together, we may ask what is the meaning of these 
.two values at this age level? The interpretation suggested is that 
it is indicative of a developmental change in the level of the child's 
cognitive operations occuririg at seven years of age. It means that 
the seven year old ch:l.ld is ascribing gender on the basis of genitals 
and secondary se;icual characteristics (stage 3) whereas previously 
(state 1 and 2), ascription was derived from size-based intuitions 
(see Table 3). 
This finding casts a different reflection on the traditionally 
held Freudian view relating to the child's acquisition of gender 
identity (Freud, 1908), which stresses the interaction between the 
child's wishes and the adult's provision or witholding the anatomical 
inf ormationo Out data reveals ·that children are still confused about 
genital differ~nces at an age (4-5 years) when they clearly stereotype 
gender in terms of size, strength and .aggression, which suggests that 
genital considerations do not form the direct basis of sex-role 
definition. Rather it appears that it is only at the age of about 
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seven years when the child realises that genitals are the basis for 
gender ascription that they acquire new significance and centrality. 
These results are consistent with a number of previous studies; 
Conn (1940) and Conn and Kanner (1947) were able to elicit knowle.dge 
of genital differences in a doll play interview from only 50 per cent 
of children between four and six years, from 72 per cent of children 
aged seven - eight, and from 86 per cent of children aged eleven -
twelve. Katcher (1955) reports that in a task in which children 
were required to assemble and identify the. gender of several cut out 
figures, with unclothed figures, some error in. genital assignment 
was made by 88 per cent of the three year olds, 69 per cent of the 
four year olds, and 31 per cent of the six year olds. 
In the table of chi-squares referred to above the other values 
worth noting are 3.92391 and 1.31522 derived from the observed 
frequencies of 1 and 3 in stage 3, occuring within the four year and 
five year old samples respectively. Here, particularly in the case 
of the four year olds, thechi-square value indiciates a departure 
of the observed frequency from the hypothesised in the opposite 
direction to that described for the seven year olds, i.e. that there 
are notably few stage 3 responses occuring within these samples. 
These observations are congruent with our description of the 
nature of the younger child's thought described in the earlier 
sections of this chapter. 
Looking at the observed frequencies of the six year old sample, 
they do not depart to any great extent from the hypothesised 
frequencies and it is reasonable to assume that as regards ascription, 
the child of this .age is moving away from the intuitive judgements 
characterised by the yotmger child. 
Summary 
This chapter investigates the development of the cognitive 
operations employed by the child in making gender ascriptionso 
It begins by describi_ng why the earliest social distinctions 
made by the young child are dependent upon physical attributes. 
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Social and behavioural attributes are defined in body terms, particu-
larly sizeo The child at the preconceptual level begins to 
reconstruct all that has developed at the sensori .. motor level, but 
this time at the level of representational tho_ught, facilitated by the 
use of languageo But as yet there are no operations, i.e. no con-
servationo The child uses ready-made schemas derived from his 
sensori-motor experience to interpret these social realitieso 
The responses of the four year old sample to the Gender Size 
Measure were statistically analysed. This was a simple projective 
measure devised by the author which required the subjects to ascribe 
gender to drawings of two dogs of different sizes. 92 per cent of 
the four year olds, relying on size based intuitions, maintained that 
the larger dog was a male and the smaler dog was a female (see Table 
3). 
Chi-square= 17.64, df = 1, p ~ .oos 
A further enquiry in the form of an open ended question, "if you 
saw a dog in the street, how would you tell if 1t was a boy or a girl 
dog?", evoked a wide range of responses from 100 subjects between 
four and seven years of age. The responses were cat_egorized into 
3 stages each representing a certain level of operations. The 
frequency of responses from each age_ group falling into each of the 
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three stages appear in Table So Chi-square= 29.7578, df = 6, p < .oos. 
Developmental trends were interpreted from the data, revealing that 
children are still confused about genital differences at an age (4-5) 
when they clearly stereotype gender in terms of size, strength and 
_a_ggression~ which suggests that genital considerations do not form 
the direct basis of sex role definition for young childreno Rather 
it appears that it is only at the age of about seven years when the 
child realises that genitals are the basis for gender ascription 
that they acquire new significance and centrality. 
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GENDER CLASSIFICATION 
Let us consider what the word 'boy' or _'girl' means to the you?g 
child of about three years. To the adult, it is an arbitrary word 
signifyi!1 g a wide r~nge of attributes disti_nguish~ng between the sexes. 
It is a v·erbal representation of a class of bei_ngs rec_ognised by the 
use of the label; in fact the definition of the word is a definition of 
class. 
Al tho~gh words play a tremendously important role in facili tati_ng 
the development of concepts, conceptual think~ng does not automatically 
occur when the child ~egins to talko When he first uses words, the 
child is not us~ng them as ~igns or representation for objects and 
events, but merely as utterances that function as 'speaking schemas' 
which assimilate various environnental events. For example, say~ng 
'mama' when mother appears need not be psychologically different from 
~~gging her when she holds the child in her lap. 
How.is it then that the word 'boy' or _'girl' moves from an un-
stable, loosely connected sound associated with the self to a verbal 
representation of a whole class of be~ngs? Accord~ng to Kohlb~rg 
(1966) , children learn: gender self-labell~ng early (_age two-three), and 
in the next two years learn to label others correctly according to 
conventional cues. Kohlb~rg refers to this as a ·~ognitive reality 
jll:dgenient'. Ye~ such jll:dgements are only intuitive -- the child is 
still far from being able to nake the cat_egorization of what makes up 
the class of boys o~ girls, men or women. He has yet to learn how to 
invest the label 'boy or _'girl with properties which will enable it to 
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claim membership of a class of be~ngs sharing common properties. 
The child of two to four years has.many difficulties, even when 
he can use language fairly well in everyday situations. Pi_aget 
illustrates from his record of his daughter, Jacqueline, how words 
used as names are not concepts in the way they are for adults. 
"At about 2 :6, she used to term 'the sl_ug', for the 
slugs we went to see every morni_ng al~ng a certain 
road. At 2:7 she cried, "There it is", on seei_ng 
one and when we saw another ten yards further on 
she said, "There is the sl_ug _again". I answered, 
"But isn't it another one?" J. went back to see 
the first one. 
"Is it the same one?" 
"Yes", she answered. 
"Another s l_ug?" 
"Yes", she answered _again. The question obviously 
had no meaning. (Piaget 1951, p.225.) 
Purpose 
The purpose of the present section is to examine the development 
of the operations that the child uses in acquiri_ng the ability to form 
an abstract conception of class involvi_n~ gender. According to the 
cognitive developmental theory, the reality judgements leadi_ng to 
appropriate self-cat_egorization and cat:egorization of others, are judge-
ments which follow a r_egular course of _age-development in the child's 
ability to make sirnpl~ gender classifications. In subsequent chapters 
we will cons:i,.der how the early classification schemas broaden and ramify. 
(See Additive Composition of Gender Class, and Gender-Age Time.) 
Postulations 
The cognitive developmental theory leads us to postulate: 
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(p.'1.) By 5 - 6 years; the ahiZd mO'l)es feom the 'limitations of making 
reaZity judgements on the basis of a aZuster of ZooseZy heZd intuitions, 
to operations whiah permit the aZassifiaation of boy, girZ, m:zn a:nd 
woman into aorrect groupiYl{Js on the basis of a nwnber of aommon 
properties. 
We also wish to investigate the relationship between the ability to 
form classes of a physical or numerical nature, compared to gender class. 
A feature which should eme.rge clearly, is the parallel development 
between the child's social cat.egorizations and. general physical cat.ego-
rizations, as the operations involved are the same. This should provide 
support for the ~ognitive developmental view of sex-role acquisition 
that the stabilization of the operations involved in acquiri.n~ gender 
identity is only one aspect of the. general stabilization of constancies 
of physical reality objects that take place between the years three 
and seven. Hence the followi.ng postulation: 
(p.2.) The diffiauZties that the ahiZd e:x;perienaes in estabZishing 
gender definitions aZoseZy paraZZeZ his diffiauities in estabZishing 
stabZe definitions of physiaaZ aonaepts in general-, and the former are 
resoZved as the Zatter are. 
Rationale: The Classification of Concepts 
Before going on to describe our techniques for obtaining informa-. . 
tion about gender-class concepts, let us consider the meaning of 'class' 
which is emp~oyed in the experimental invest.igations: 
In order to classify objects int~ groups, there must be a mental 
representation of a set of cat.egories throughout the sorting process; 
each category has a defini.ng characteristic that determines whether an 
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·object is put into that category, and each set of objects must be 
considered as a number of distinct individual objects with'.a common 
feature that defines the class. In this respect there are four signi-
ficant points : 
(a) No object is a member of both classes simultaneously, ~.g. 
the red triangle is in the class of tri~gles and not also 
in the class of circles. The classes are mutually exclusive 
or disjoint. 
(b) All members of a class share one similarity. For example, a 
l~rge blue circle and a small red circle share the property 
of circularity which is the defini.ng property of the class. 
Thus the circularity is the intension of the class, i.e. the 
defin~ng property or intension of the class is the circularity. 
Colour and not shape could also alternate ,the intension of 
the class; a large blue circle and a small blue triangle both 
share the property of 'blueness'. 
(c) Instead of describing a class by its intension or defining 
property, the class may also be described in terms of a list 
of its members or extension (small yellow triangle, large blue 
tri~ngle, etc.) 
(d) The defin~ng property of a class determines what objects are 
placed in it, i.e., the intension defines the extension. This 
means that if we know that a particular class is formed on the 
basis of circularity and another on the basis of triangularity, 
then the content of the list in each case can be predicted. 
The problems which confronted Pi.aget were -- do children classify 
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objects in accordance with these properties? When is the child able to 
form mutually exclusive classes? And, do his classes have defin~ng 
properties which determine the list of objects in each case? Inhelder 
and Piaget (1959, 1964) inves~igated these problems by means of a 
number of experiments which are related to our own techniques of in-
vestigation. 
The Measure 
Our measure consists of a total of 48 square cards with styalized 
monochrome ink drawi.ngs approximately the size of playi.ng cards. The 
measure was sub-divided into• three sections consisti.ng of 16 cards 
each, which were administered separately. 
(a) A heterogeneous ass0r.>tment contains: 
4. geometrical shapes -- a tria.ngle, square, circle and star. 
4 animals -- a hippopotomous, monkey, elephant and. giraffe. 
4 different types of flowers. 
4 people -- boy'· girl, man and ·woman. 
(b) AnirraZ Speaies -- four different breeds of dogs, cats, rabbits 
and birds. 
(c) Gender -- four men, four women, four boys and four. girls. 
Development of Measure 
Before finally arrivi.ng at the present form of the measure, various 
alternative forms were considered and tested in the pilot study. In 
developi.ng the measure, a number of important features were included: 
First, it was important that the classification tasks be subdivided 
into at least two comparitive sections in order that the child's per-
formance on the gender classification task could be compared with his 
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performance on another relatively neutral classification task. The 
heterogeneous assortment and the species assortment were considered 
separately as to their suitability as controls to th~ gender task. 
The heter.ogeneous task appeared to us to be intuitively closer to 
Pi.aget 's original classification tasks, while the species identity 
task was considered likely to elicit very similar cues to the. gender 
tasks. After comparing all three tasks in the pilot study, it ~as 
decided that the final measure would include two controls to which 
the. gender performance could be compared. 
Practical factors considered in developing the measure: 
(a) As all the tasks required sorti.ng, the size and thiakness of the 
aards has to afford easy hand Zing by young ahi Uren, hence the 
playing card size was found to be most convenient. 
(b) The number of cards to be classified in each section had to be 
great enought to provide evidence that the child was able to make 
a consistent assortment without the task beaoming too Z.aborious 
or time aonsuming. From an initial 20 cards, with S in each class, 
it was found both equally effective and more convenient to reduce 
each test to 16 cards with 4 in each class. 
(c) The draJJ)ings had to be aZear and unarrbiguous. The use of colours 
or shadi.ng was avioded as it was likely that the subjects would 
rely on colour intension cues in classifyi.ng. The final drawfogs 
consis~ed of stylised monochrome ink drawi.ngs. 
(d) No drawing was id.entiaaZ. The artist initially des.igned that were 
both identical and coloured the same. This was found to be un-
suitable as children's success on such a task might not necessarily 
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be due to true classification. Inhelder and Pi_aget (1964} ·for 
example,_ gave young children no more than two years old, a 
nwnber of coloured shaped mosaics and let them play with them. 
They described how the subjects might_ group together red ones 
or the squares -- often they formed some sort of geometrical 
pattern composed of pieces of a si_ngle shape. This behaviour 
made it appear that the children were classifying the objects 
to the shape, and picki_ng out all the members of a class to 
form a geometrical shape, but Pi_aget denies this interpretation. 
He describes it as the successive assimilation of square objects 
by sensory-motor schema, and perhaps also the rec_ogni tion of 
the homogeneity of the line of objects if they are all the same 
shape. But they are not. grouped into a class on the basis of 
squareness. It could be that the first shape is matched by the 
second in shape, but the third is matched to the second in 
colour a sort of chain reaction, which is not a classification 
at all but merely a momentary clusteri_ng of two objects because 
of their similarity. In our tests we took precautions to avoid 
this by usi_ng linear drawi_ngs with each item in the class bei_ng 
different. 
Age of Subjects 
The classification tasks were administered to a total of 75 sub-
jects between four and six years, with 25 subjects in each group. 
Procedure 
Each child is individually presented with a shuffled pile of the 
heter_ogeneous assortment of pictures. E. gives the followi_ng 
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instructions, ''Here are some pictures of different thi_ngs that 
belong together. Sort them out and put them into groups where they 
belo_ng. Tell me when you are finished." 
The time for the task to be completed is noted. Relevant 
comments by the subject as well as pertinent observations about the 
( 
way in which the subject tackles the task are recorded. 
The next task is then presented, which is the assortment of 
different species of animals. E •. gives the same instructions as 
above beginni_ng with, "Now we have_ got some pictures of different 
animals all mixed up t_ogether " 
Finally the Gender Task is administered with the instructions, 
"Here are some pictures of. people all mixed up. Now I want you to put 
the people into groups where they belo_ng. Put the people t_ogether 
who belong t_ogether. Each_ group must be different. Tell me when you 
are finished." 
The order of the presentation of (a) and (b) is alternated with 
each administration; (c) is always presented third. 
Treatment of Responses 
The children's responses to each of the three classification 
tasks were cat_egorized into two st_ages: 
Stage 1. These are responses which indicated that the child does not 
operate under an overaH guiding plan. He classifies in a primitive 
way: his_ groupings are dominated by momentary impressions and acci-
dents. 
Stage 2. The sorti_ng of children at st_age 2 becomes more systematic 
in the sense that a si_ngle criterion is exhaustively applied to the 
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domain. The intension (similarity among objects). determines the 
extension (ioeo which objects are to be grouped ~ogether). If the 
child defines a collection on the basis of the defining property of 
circularity for example, all the circles would.go in one pile and 
none placed in another pileo 
The method of enquiry provided data on two levels: (a) quantita-
tive data which is presented in two tables and (b) qualitative data 
describi_ng the structure o~ the child's thought. Table 6 shows the 
number of responses at each st_age of gender classification develop-
ment per sample_ group o The data in this table related to the 
postulate (p.1) that the reality judgements leading to appropriate 
categorizations are judgements which ·follow a r_e.gular course of _age-
development dependent upon c_o.gni tive organisation. Table 7 shows 
the relationship between the number of children at various _ages 
achieving success on the gender classification task and two control 
tasks, (a) the heter.oge_neous task and (b) the species cat_egorization 
tasko The data in this table relates to the 'parallellism' postulate 
(p.2), that the difficulties the child experiences in establishing 
gender definitions closely parallel! his difficulties in establishing 
stable definitipns of physical concepts in general, and the former 
are resolved as .. the la tt~r ar~ o 
Statistical Treatment and Discussion of Results 
In order to demonstrate the postulate that by 5-6 year~ the 
child moves from the limitations of making reality judgements on the 
basis of a cluster of loosely held intuitions, to operations which 
permit the classification of boy,_ girl, man and woman into correct 
groupings on the basis of a number of common properties, the 
response~ of the 4, 5. and 6 year old samples to the Gender 
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Classification Measure were statistically analysed by the chi-square 
for its significance. (See Table 6.) 
2 
x = 12.013, df = 2, p < .01 
The null hypothesis is rejected. The distribution of observed 
frequencies representing stage 1 and stage 2 responses between the 
three age groups was found to depart significantly from the 
expected frequencies. 
In order to observe developmental trends, from the table of 
individual chi-square values we note that the value of 4.45454 and 
3.500 are somewhat higher than the other values in the table. 
Although nothing can be stated on the basis of the chi-square 
analysis regarding the significance of these values, it is worth 
noting that both these values occur within the four year old 
sample. The former value corresponds to the observed frequency 
of 18 in stage 1, the latter to the frequency of 7 in stage 2. 
The above suggests that the responses of the four year old sample 
are predominantly at stage 1. 72 per cent of the four year 
olds are still unable to operate under an overall guiding plan. 
They classify in a primitive way; their_ groupings are dominated 
by momentary impressions and accidents. However, we find the 
converse is true for the six year old sample. Their sorting 
becomes more systematic in that a single criterion is exhaustively 
applied to the domain. 
Hence it is reasonable to conclude .that the data from the 
Gender Classification Task appeari_ng in Table 6 suggests a 






The number of children achieving success on the 
. gender classification task (Task C) and two 
control tasks, the heterogeneous task (Task A) 
and the species task (Task B). 
TASK A TASK B TASK C 
Observed Expected Observed Expected Observed Expected 
7 7.30 8 7.30 6 6.39 
21 20.52 21 20.52 17 17. 96 
20 20.17 19 20.17 19 17065 
x2 = .348857, df = 4, p) .975 
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the 5-6 year level enabling him to conceive of boy, girl, man and 
woman as discrete categories. 
Table 7 presents the number of children achieving success on the 
gender classification task and two control tasks. The data in 
this table relates to the 'pa.rallellism' postulate. 
Through considering the pattern of results across tasks 
for each age group, the intention is to show that the pattern for 
each age group is essentially similar. The chi-square test 
was selected to demonstrate this similarity. This test is 
normally used to show that patterns are dissimilar when the chi-
square is significant. The purpose here however, is to obtain 
a significantly insignifiaant chi-square. 
2 
x = 0 34885 7' df = 4' p > 0 97 5 
The null hypothesis is supported. This means that we find a 
high correlation between the child's. success on the gender task 
and the two control tasks. 
By ref erri.ng to the previous chapter on Gender Ascription, it 
is interesting to note how the large majority of the same sample 
of four year olds (92 per cent), who are unable to make consistent 
categorizations of gender as a class of beings, yet demonstrate 
their successful reliance upon intuitions derived from early 
physicalistic modes such as size. They intu1tively recognise 
ascription with having the facility of bei.ng able to logically 
understand such ascription, since the ability to group or 
order into classes still eludes them. The Gender Classification 
Measure reveals their ability to cat.egorize begins to occur 
around 5-6 years. 
These findings are in accordance with studies of children 
reported by Piaget and Inhelder (1958, 1964). The describe 
evidence of two phenomena in the attempts of children between 
two and four years to classify. 
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(a) Synoretism, which is the tendency to group together a 
number of desperate events into an ill-defined illogical whole and, 
(b) Juxtaposition, which is the inability to see that several 
objects are indeed members of the same class. 
Inhelder and Piaget (1958, 1964) describe how in their 
experiments with. children of three and four years, when. given a 
heterogeneous assortment of objects, cut out pictures of. geometric 
forms, plants, animals and people, the subject may start by 
putting some squares together, then go on to add a few circles 
and never finish the squares; or he may go on to put a few plants 
together adding a few people but never adding all the people. 
The characteristic feature of children at this age is lack of 
co-ordination of the properties or qualities that are being 
grouped. Resemblance may influence the child's decision one 
moment, spatial proximity at another, or even some play theme 
like 'making a farm 1 at the next. 
Qualitative Trends 
Below are presented some protocols of children whose responses 
to the classification tasks were categorized into Stage I. The 
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errors made by our subjects revealed: 
(a) that the yo~ng children perceives simiZarities among the 
objects, yet these do not fully determine what. goes into a collection. 
This is also what Pi.aget and Inhelder (1964, p. 21) reported from 
testing a number of children between two and five years of .age. 
Pi.aget describes how one child put two dolls in a cradle, then two 
wheelbarrows t.ogether, then a house was added. When the child was 
asked for all the objects like a horse, she gave him all the animals 
then a baby and two trees. The intention or similarity that the 
subject or.iginally perceives does not determine the extension. 
(b) Another error observed in. groupi.ng objects at this st.age is 
what Pi.aget calls 'small partial al.ignments' when the child uses 
some of the objects in the or.iginal array and puts them t.ogether in 
several ways apparently without any overall guidi_ng plan. Small 
partial alignments are not true classes for the reason that the 
intension does not define extension. 
(c) Children at this st_age were also observed to arr~nge the 
material to be sorted in order to construct an interesti_ng form or 
story picture. Piaget calls these 'complex'objects'. For example, 
children were observed to group the. gender pictures t.ogether to 
'make a family' or the geometric shapes together to 'build a wall'. 
The characteristic feature of children at this st.age is lack of co-
ordination of the properties or qualities that are being. grouped. 
Stage 1 ~ · (A) The Hetereogeneous · tS.sks 
Carolyn (4:3) tackles the hetereogeneous task enthusiastically 
yet somewhat impulsively. She bei.ngs to build a 'complex' by 
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arbi traril)' grouping a few cards "that look nice t.ogether". On 
being. given the instructions .again to make quite sure that she 
understands the requirements, she b.egins to put a few 'shapes' 
together but soon becomes distracted by other items and does not 
go on to complete the task. 
Nicola ( 4: 3) arbitrarily makes groups of cards - - taki.ng one 
card at a time from the pile in her hand and placing it on the table 
saying, "That one. goes the:re, that one ca11: go there ... etc." with-
out any intension. When asked, "Why did you put that one there?" 
She replies, "Because I want it there." 
Kate (4:7) becomes disconcerted as she searched for identical 
cards and does not find them. "None of them are the sameo·, she corn.; 
plains. E. "Put t.ogether the ones that belong t.ogether." uBut they 
are all different." She gives up. 
Julian (6: 4) b.egins by systematically putting different cards 
at different corners of the table, but he soon forgets the criterion 
for the cat.egory and confuses shapes with people. He puts four 
flowers t.ogether then adds a monkey. When aksed the reason for this, 
he replies, "Because it climbs trees." 
(B) The Species Task' 
In the species task Carolyn (4:3) enjoys shuffi.ng through the 
cards as they are spread across the table before her. She maintains, 
"I like to collect pictures." She manages to sort the four d.ogs and 
four cats into. groups, but then goes on to contaminate the sequences 
by addi.ng . the rabbi ts and the birds arbitrarily. 
Lindsay (4:11) laboriously sorts all the cards across the table. 
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"This is like .J.ayi.ng the table", she comments. E. discovered that 
at this particular nursery school each child has their own distinctive 
animal place mat at their lunch table, which explained why Lindsay 
was putti.ng individual cards in different positions around the table. 
E. explained that she must not play at layi.ng the table, but that she 
should put the pictures together that are the same, or belong t.ogether. 
Lindsay however found it difficult to change her mental set. 
Anton (4:9) shuffles all the cards around the table with both 
hands. On being reminded to put the ones t.ogether that. go t.ogether, 
he succeeds in maki.ng two pairs of d.ogs and two pairs of rabbi ts. 
E. asks him if all the rabbits are· not the same. He agrees, and decides 
to put them t.ogether. He does the same with the dogs. But the birds 
and the cats remain scattered before him. He appears confused as what 
to do with them. After examini.ng them for a few moments, he tells 
E. that the game is finished. It appears that Anton only managed to 
group the rabbits and the dogs thro.ugh the assistance of E's question, 
and the fact that he had formed two pairs. His initial success was not 
due to true classification as his later performance indicated. 
Some children such as Andrew (4:4) sorted the species into "the 
ones I like" and "the ones I don't like". Similarly Caroline (5: 3) 
puts animals together "that belo.ng in the Jungle book". Chrystal 
(6:4) compares all sorts of features such as tails, or whether the 
animals are standing or sitti.ng. She does not appear satisfied with 
her efforts, "I am just stupid", she says. 
(c) The Gender Task 
The same type of errors in the control tasks appeared in gender 
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classification, Kirsty ( 4: 4) does not follow thr~ugh the defini_ng 
properties of classes. As in her other performances, a few items 
in a class are arranged in a small partial aHgnment, but she for-
gets what she was about to achieve. After.a pause she breaks up 
the correct sequence, only to put t_ogether _again a few items which 
are 'standing the same way". 
Anton (4:9) names the cards, "boy", _"girl", "lady", etc., as 
he places them on the table from the pil_e in his hand. He asks, 
"Did you draw them?" Then begins to place them all one next to the 
other in a long row, after which he announces that he has finished. 
E. asks him if he has put all the people into the correct groups 
where they belong. He replies that he has. 
Kate (4:7) sorts out all the females from the males while com-
menti_ng about their dresses, "This one's got a nice dress. This 
one's got a funny dress. Who is this?" Leavi_ng the males unsorted, 
she places all the dresses in a row. By relying on articulated in-
tuition she has in fact succeeded in discriminating class one the 
basis of the presence or absence of a dress. But she is not aware 
that she is categorizi_ng males and females. The males are left un-
sorted. 
Deborah (4:3) shuffles the cards into different positions on the 
table. Previously she had just succeeded in classifyi_ng the species 
task correctly. ur can't do these, these aren't the same." E. 
"Aren't any the same?" "No, they are all different." E. "Don't any 
belo_ng together?" D. "No, they belo_ng where they are:" Andrew 
(4:4) is also emphatic that they are not the same. He only manages 
. :, :~ : 
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to place a few boys and men t.ogether after a little encour.agement. 
The girls and ladies are .ignored. 
Stuart (4:9) makes three arbitrary groups from any cards which 
just happen to be nearby. He then plays with the figures, and uses 
them as illustrations for the story he tells E. 
Stage 2 
Compared to the children at stage 1 who appear confused, or 
get distracted by irrelevant details, the child at st.age 2 b.egins to 
work methodically thro.ugh all the i terns. They often anticipate the 
formation of a. group when they reach a new card in the pile that 
they are sorting, the card is put at one of the corners of the 
table in abayance if it does not match the items that are lying dis-
played. Many children.proceed to cat.egorize in this manner. Alter-
natively, they spread the whole pile of cards out on the table and 
systematically select members of a class, one at a time, from them. 
After most of th~ groups have been arranged before them they apply 
themselves to sort any loose cards which they were previously unsure 
of. 
It became evident that a number of children soon recognise that 
each category only contain four items, and use this as an aid in 
formi.ng. groups. This applies particularly to the gender task, when 
the child initially sorts the cards into two l~rge. groups and then 
goes on to break them down into four smaller groups. 
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Summary 
Consideration is paid to how the word 'boy' or 'girl' moves 
from an intuitive, loosely connected sound associated with the self 
to a verbal reprsentation of a whole class of bei.ngs. Children 
learn gender self-labelHng early (age two.;.;three) and in the next 
two years learn to lable others correctly accordi.ng to conventional 
cues. 
Two postulates derived from the c.ognitive developmental theory 
are invest.i.gated experimentally through analysis of the responses of 
75 children between the .ages of four and six years on three classifi-
cation tasks: (a) a hetereogeneous task, (b) a species task, and 
(c) a gender classification task. The findings are presented quan-
titatively in table form showi.ng the comparitive scores for each 
age group on each task thus reveal~ng (a) the relationship between 
.age and stage of classification (b) the parallel development between 
gender classification and two control tasks. Further, a qualitative 
observation of the structure of the child's thought at each st.age is 
presented with illustrations from children's protocols. 
The findi.ngs indicate: 
(_a) The reality judgements leading to appropriate self-categori-
zation and categorizations of others are.judgements which follow a 
r.egular course of age-development of the child's ability to make 
simple classifications, and: 
(b) The difficulties that the child experiences in establishing 
gender definition closely parallel his difficulties in establishing 
stable definitions of physical objects in general, and the former are 
resolved as the latter are. 
Class inclusion 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
GENDER CLASS INCLUSION 
93. 
Up to now we have attempted to demonstrate how the child's. gender 
concepts of boy, girl, man, woman moves from a 'preconcept' (at 
approximately 4 years) to an ability to understand that boys, girls, 
men and women actually form a class of beings, He develops an ability 
to perceive similarities and differences in attributes between these 
beings .. and, moreover to realise that he himself is part of such a 
class. 
In spite of the fact that the child of 5 - 6 appears to grasp the 
principles of classification, Piaget found that the child is still not 
capable of regarding as permanent the relations of the part to the 
whole in the realm of classes. He is still not able to understand the 
relations among different levels of an hierarchy, which is the problem 
of class inclusion. 
Inhelder and Piaget (1964) devised the followi_ng type of experi-
ment to test the child's understandi.ng of such hierarchical classifica-
tion, i.e. to find the earliest age level at which he understands the 
principle that subgroups may be members of a h.igher ranki.ng order. The 
child is shown a number of counters some blue and some red, some circu-
lar and some square. In this particular experiment all the blue coun-
ters were circular. The child is then asked whether this is true. 
"Are all the squares red?" "Are all the circles blue?" A typical error 
of the child at four or five years is to answer the question: "Are all 
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the circles bluett in the negative and to justify his answer by sayi.ng 
"because there is a blue square". This type of ~esponse at this .age 
makes it appear that .the child does not disti.nguish between the ques-
tion "Are all the circles blue?" and "Are all the blue ones circles?" 
This type of error is seen by Inhelder and Pi.aget as resulti.ng from 
his inability to form a l~gi.cal class. 
Inhelder and Piaget believe that the question "Are all the squares 
blue?" is the same as "Are all the circles quivalent to some of the 
blues?" and that one source of error is that the child at this _age does 
not understand what the terms 'all or 'some' mean. Evidence from their 
other experiments indicate that children tend to think of 'all' as 
befog rather a la_rge nu nber as th~ugh it meant 'many' while 'some' means 
the same as 'few'. A child of five when presented with two blue squares, 
three red squares, and two blue circles and asked if all the circles 
were blue said, "No, there are only two" as if the word 'all' should not 
be applied to such a small nunber of objects. 
Gender Class Hierarchy 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a class is a set of objects 
or events that have certain characteristics in common. The common 
characteristics define the class, and the label 'boy', 'girl', 'man' or 
'woman' designates this class. Movi.ng on from here the child gradually 
pegins to understand the variety of Telationships that classes have with 
one another. One class can be included in the other, which means that 
the two classes have the same defini_ng properties, but the sub-class 
has additional defini.ng characteristics which the class does .not have. 
The class of boys, for example, is included in the class of males; 
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all the defining properties of males apply to boys, but in addition 
to bei.ng a male, a boy must have some additional specific characteri-
sties that dinsti.nguishes him from other males. In the chapters 
dealing with gender-size and. gender-.age we consider more fully the 
attributes that a child uses to dinsti.nguish between the gender sub-
classes. In this chapter however, we focus on the sequence of st.ages 
of the operations permitti.ng an understandi.ng of the hierarchy of 
classes relevant to. gender classification. 
The Purpose of the Present Section 
The purpose is threefold: 
(a) To invest.igate the operations by which children develop the 
important gender concept of 'we males' or 'we females' and the mecha-
nics of classification necessary to acquire such a concept. In this 
regard the f ollowi.ng "postulates are presented: 
(p .1) In spite of the faat the ahi Zd of 5 - 6 yelZl.ls is ab Ze to 
. {JI"asp the operation of aorrrparing part with pa:!lt in the aZa.ssification 
of boy, girl, rran or woman into aorreat {JI"OUping on the basis of a 
number of aorrunon properties; he is stiZZ not able to understand the 
reZa.tions among different Zevels of cr:n hieX'a:!'ahy, which is the problem 
of aorrrpa:!'ing pa:!'t with the whole. 
(p. 2) Until the ahiZd is aapabZe of estabUshing a permanent 
relation of part with the whole (aZa.ss inclusion) at seven years of 
age, he wiZZ not be able to {JI"asp that boys and men are part of the 
aZa.ss of maZes and girls and women are a parit of the alass of females. 
(b) The data in this section is intended to provide experimental 





1) When compari_ng part 
with whole, the whole ~ 
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previously. 





nent relation between 
whole and parts. 
Concept 'all' and 'some' 
still eludes child. 
CLASSIFICATION 
St_age 2 
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systematic. 
2) Child is able to 
compare part with 
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discovery that part 
and whole are charact-
erized by the same 
attributes. 
2 - 5 year~. 5 - 6 years 7 - 8 years 
Figure 2: Predicted sequence of stages in movi_ng from simple classification to 
class inclusion. 
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identification, i.e. that identification is not the aause of the child's· 
desire to ascribe to generalised sex-role stereotypes, as according to 
traditional theories but that it is aonsequenae of normal cognitive 
development. It is our argument that it is not until the child is 
capable of perceivi.ng the same-sex adult model as a member of the same 
class that he will be able to consistently model or identify with 
members of that class. This means that the boy of six or seven years, 
for example, only b.egins to realise the 'like self' nature of the 
fa th er' s. gender when he is ab le to see him as a man in the class of 
males, and himself as a boy in the same category. Such an understanding 
implies a grasp of operations to additively compose classes or class 
inclusion. 
(c) Further, this section is intended to demonstrat that the 
acquisition of the process of gender class inclusion is parallel to the 
process of object class inclusion as demonstrated by Inhelder and 
Pi.aget (1964). 
Development of the Measure 
The present method and procedure was developed from Pi.aget' s 
experiments of the relationship of the inclusion of one class in 
another. His classification experiments have been described a number 
of times and replicated by Elkind (1961) and Lovell (1961). These are 
the classic experiments with wooden beads: 
The child is shown a box containi.ng only wooden beads, most of 
them brown but two of them white. The child is asked whether the box 
contained more wooden beads or more brown beads. This question in-
volved the most elementary form of additive composition of classes. 
~7. 
A +A' ~ B therefore A' ~ B - A and A ( B 
This problem appeared too difficult for children ~ged four to 
six years, so Pi_aget rephrased it in more intuitive terms. The child 
is presented with a set of wooden beads comprisi_ng of about 20 brown 
and 2 of white colour.· The child is asked if all the brown beads are 
strung into a necklace would there be any left? 
The child replies that the white ones would remain. E the~ goes 
on to ask, "And if I strung all the wooden ones into a necklace would 
there be any left? "No" replies the child. Then E asks, "Which would 
be longer, a necklace with all the wooden beads, or a necklace with 
all the brown beads?" 
The child of 5 - 6 then generally replies that the one made with 
all the brown beads would be l~nger because there are only a few white 
ones, or because there are more brown beads than white ones. 
Having built up clear evidence of the systematic diffuclty experi-
enced by children under 7 - 8 years includi_ng one class in another, 
and understand~ng that a total class is wider than one included in it, 
Piaget persued the theme by conducti_ng a number of anal_agous experiments 
with classes, each of which had a proper name. An example of such an 
experiment was one usi_ng 'poppies' and 'bluebells', both belonging to 
the class of flowers. This was to obviate the criticism that 'wooden 
beads' was artificial in that it had no specific name. 
Another objection he anticipated was that the subordinate classes 
he had used were more prominant perceptually than the superordinate as 
the former had been defined in terms of colours. Therefore, in further 
control experiments, superordinate class was colour (blue beads) while 
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the superordinate ones were shape. (Square versus round beads.) 
Pi.aget also added an example of a social cat.egory, with 12. girls and 
2 .boys forming the subordinate, and 'children' formi.ng the super-
ordinate. He found the same kind of answer was given as in the case 
of beads. The subjects in fact found the questions referring to_ girls 
and children easier than the questions about beads which Pi.aget felt 
was due to the fact that the use of classes which have specific names 
are an aid in differentiating between them and formi.ng the hierarchy. 
Once the decision had been made to demonstrate the acquisition 
of gender class in the same way that P~aget demonstrated the acquisi-
tion of object-class, consideration was paid to developi.ng a standardi- · 
zed measure that would be both efficient and reliable. The measure 
would contain tw~ gender tasks and two control tasks which were repli-
cations of Pi.aget' s tasks. 
Description of the Measure 
The tasks that were adopted consisted of: 
(a) A task anal_agous to Pi_aget' s 'flower' task. 
(b) The 'all or some' task referring to children. 
(c) A gender task with boys and males, and 
(d) A second gender task referri.ng to girls and 
females. 
' .. ~. 
The material that is presented to the child consists of four large 
cards with the f ollowi.ng drawings: (see the drawi.ngs in the appendix ft..) 
(a) Flowers: Twenty small red flowers clustered 
to the left of the card and two l~rge yellow 
flowers on the r.ight. 
(b) · ChiZd:Pen: . Twelve girls stand.i.ng in a group 
with two boys in the background. 
(c) Males: 'Ihree men in the upper left corner 
and a group of ten boys on the · r.igh t of the 
picture. 
(d) Females: Two women standi.ng t.ogether on the 
right of the picture with ten girls spread 
out to the left. 
Developing the Measure 
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A trial study was undertaken to we.igh the effectiveness of various 
alternative forms of presentation. 
(a) The number of elements in the subclasses were varied to best 
emphasise the 'all or some' nature of the tasks. Twenty poppies and 
two roses as in Piaget's Flower task were found satisfactory, while ten 
girls and two women, and three men and ten boys were found well suited 
to the purpose. 
(b) In order to minimize reliance upon langu.age, all the questions 
referred to the respective drawings set before the child. The task 
involv~ng children (Task B) unlike Pi.aget' s (and Elkind, 1961) study 
also referred to a drawi.ng rather than the actual school class the child 
was in. 
(c) Various froms of presenting the gender task were considered, such 
as, "If all the boys went into a· .house, would there be any males left?" 
Rather than a house, a bus appeared more appropriate, particularly as 
the final question was, "Would the bus be fuller if it had all the males 
or if i.t had all the boys inside?" 
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'··:· 
(d) It was discovered that the terms 'males' and 'females' were not 
yet part of many childre~'s vocabulary, particularly the younger 
children. Therefore, in the introductory questions with each child, 
E.satisfied himself that the child becaine acquainted with these terms, 
for example, E: "A zi these people are males" • • • and "show me the 
males (s. indicates "That's r.ight all these people are males", etc. 
A major problem that became evident at this st.age lead to the 
dropping of the entire Afrikaans speaki.ng sample that was to be in-
·'.. . 
eluded. This had to do with the translation of the words 'male' and 
'female'. The Afrikaans words. 'manlik' and 'vroulik' are literally 
equivalent to the E.nglish 'man-like' and 'women-like' and could not be 
used in the same context as the ~nglish. Also in the Afrikaans lan-
~age, the distinction between males 'manlike persone' and men, 'mans-
mense' was so sl.ight that the Afrikaans children found the questions 
confusing. It was decided that as it was not possible to translate 
this section of the text satisfactorily into Afrikaans, the Afrikaans 
speaki.ng sample had to be forfeitedo We were obviously confronted 
by semantic problems which, although interest~ng, were beyond the 
scope of the present invest.igation. 
Administration 
Each child was seen individually. The two control tasks were 
administered first, alternating the order of presentation between 
subjects. After which boys were given the .'gender-males' task, 
followed by 'gender-females' while. girls were. given the 'gender-
females' task then the. 'gender-males' task • 
. The standard question sequence as set out below were generally 
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adhered to, with all the responses of the children recorded in the 
space provided. Where responses or questions were considered to be 
worth further invest_igation, they were followed through, and recorded. 
(a) FZ(JIJ)ePs 
E: Look are there a lot of flowers in this field? 
S: A lot. 
E: What colour are they? 
S: Red and Yellow. 
E: The red ones are poppies and the yellow ones 
are daisies. I want to make a very b_ig bunch. 
Must I pick the flowers or the poppies? 
S: The poppies. 
E: Show me the poppies. (S. indicates.) 
E: Show me the flowers. (S. indicates the whole 
drawi_ng.) 
E: Then will the bunch be b_i_gger if I pick the 
flowers or the poppies? 
S: If you pick the poppies. 
E: If I pick the poppies, what will be left? 
S: The daisies. 
E: And if I pick the daisies as well, what will 
be left? 
S: Nothi_ng at all. 
E: !fuen what will be b_igger, the bunch of flowers 
or the bunch of poppies? 
S: The bunch of poppies. 
E: And what about the bunch of flowers -- will 
it be b.i.gger or smaller? 
S: Smaller. 
E: Why? 
S: Because you've made a bunch of poppies, or 
because you have got more poppies. 
(b) Chi Zdren 
S is presented with a drawi.ng of twelve. girls and two boys. 
E: Are there more girls or more children in 
this class? 
S: More girls. 
E: But aren't. girls children? 
S: Yes. 
E: Then are there more children or more. girls? 
S: More girls. 
(c) Gender-MaZes 
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S is presented with a group of males consisti,ng of ten boys and 
three men. 
E: Look at this picture. What does it show? 
S: Some men and lots of boys. 
E: All these people are males waiti.ng to catch 
the bus. Show me the males. (S. indicates.) 
The yo~nger ones are the boys and the older, 
b.i.gger ones are the men. Show me the boys 
(S. indicates.) Show me the men. (S. indi-
cates.) 
E: If all the boys_ got into the bus would there 
be any left? 
S: Yes, the men. 
E: And if all the maZes_ got into the bus 1 would 
there be any left? 
S: No. 
E: Then would the bus be fuller if it had all 
the males, or if it had all the boys inside? 
S: All the boys. 
E: But aren't boys males? 
S: Yes. 
E: Then would there be more males or more boys 
in a full bus? 
S; More boys. 
(d) Gender-FemaZes 
~03. 
S is presented with a .group of females consisti.ng of ten_ girls 
girls and two women. The instructions are similar to the ones above. 
Number and Age of Subjects 
One hundred children between 5 and 8 years of ~ge made up the 
sample 1 with 25 children in each .age_ group. 12 children between 4 
and 10 years were tested in the trial study. 
Categorization of Responses 
Stage 1 (5 - 6 years) 
Children at this stage cannot establish a permanent inclusion 
between the whole and the parts as soon as the whole is divided, even 
in thought, the parts cease to be included in it and are merely 
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juxtaposed without synthesis. In Pi.aget 's wooden beads experiments, 
children at st.age 1. grasped without difficulty that if all the wooden 
beads were taken out of an empty box there would be none left, where-
as if only the brown ones were taken out, only the white ones would 
remain. These children were unable to break down this impression and 
compare part .against whole, i.e. the brown with the wooden. Pi_aget 
remarked that the child apparently f~rgets the parts when he thinks 
of the whole, or rather, when he thinks of the whole he can envis.age 
the parts which have not yet been dissociated but when he tries to 
dissociate one of the parts he f~rgets the whole, or he di:sr.egards it, 
and merely compares the part in question with the remaini_ng part. 
Stage 2 (5 -., 6 years) 
Children's responses at the second s~age are characterized by 
the intuitive discovery of the correct answer by a form of trial and 
error, and not by immediate composition. When comparing part with 
the whole, the whole is not destroyed as previously. 
Stage 3 (7 - 8 years) 
St.age 3 is characterized by an immediate and spontaneous dis-
covery that there are more flowers than poppies 1 or, the bus would be 
fuller if it had all the males in it rather than all the boys. Child-
ren at this st.age see that the part and the whole are not defined by 
the same attributes, but that the whole comprises the remaini_ng part. 
Treatment of Responses and Discussion of Results 
The children's responses to the Class Inclusion Tasks were 
categorized into three stages in terms of Pi_aget's criteria (see 
above). Each child was given a score of 1, 2 or 3 relating to 
Table 8: 1he scores of children between 5 and 8 years on the 
Gender Class Inclusion Measure in relation to their 
age. 
AGES 5 6 7 8 
Scores of 1 17 14 8 3 
2 4 8 7 6 
3 4 3 10 16 
Age Groups N x s.o. 
5 yrs 25 1.48 • 770281 
6 yrs 25 1.56 • 711805 
7 yr~ 25 2.08 • 862168 
8 yrs 25 2.52 • 714143 
Anova Summary: 
Source S.S. DF M.S. F Ratio 
A_ge Groups 17.17 3 5.90334 10.034 
Error 56.48 96 .588333 
F = 10.034, df = 3, 96 P( .01 
---
the stage in which the response was categorized. 
The one way analysis of variance (1 way anova) was the 
statistical procedure employed to investi.age the s.ignificance 
of the developmental trends between the .ages of five and eight 
years. 
The null hypothesis tested by the one way analysis of 
variance is that there is not s.ignificant different between the 
mean. square of the scores between age. groups and the mean square 
of the scores within each age groupo 
H
1 
. is that the mean square between the s.ignif icantly larger 
than the mean square within groups. 
The results appear in Table 8. 
F = 10.034, df = 3 1 96 p ( .Ol 
'Ihe null hypothesis is rejectedo There is an overall 
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significant difference in the means of the four sample age. groups. 
We observe that there is an orderly progression in the means 
of each successive age group. The mean of the five year old 
sample is 1.48 (SD= .77), the six year olds 1.56 (SD= .71), the 
seven year olds 2.08 (SD = .86) and the eight year olds 2.52 
(SD= 071). 
In order to determine whether there were any significantly 
large increases in the mean of any one age. group compared to the 
previous age group, a further treatment was performed; the 
multiple comparison i:;)f means using the Scheffe procedure. This 
treatment revealed that none of the compared means differed at 
any acceptable level of significance. This is attributed to the 
fact that the analysis of variance provides a more powerful 
test of the hypothesis of equal means. Considering that the 
sample were of equal size it is reasonable to conclude that the 
larger mean is significantly larger than the smaller mean even 
though the Scheffe test was unable to detect this difference 
and isolate particular means which departed from the gradual 
progression. 
Interpreting the data for the light it casts on the 
structural level of the child's thought at the various ages, we 
observe that the means of the five and six year old samples re-
present operations which are predominantly stage 1. (x = 1.48, 
x = 1.56.) From the table of scores we. find that 68 and 56 per 
cent of the five and six year old's responses respectively were 
cat.egorized into stage 1. 
The child at this stage cannot establish a permanent inclu-
sion between the whole and the parts as soon as the whole is 
divided. This is in spite of the fact that the child of 5-6 
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years is able to grasp the operation of comparing part with part in 
the classification of boy, girl, man and woman into correct 
groupings on the basis of common properties (as described in the 
previous chapter on Gender Classification). The data appears to 
support the postulate (p.l) that the ability to understand relations 
among different levels of an hierarchy, which is the problem of 
class inclusion sti 11 eludes the child of this age. 
By eight years of age, the mean of this sample (x = 2.52) 
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represents operations which are predominantly stage 3. The table 
of scores shows.that only 12 per cent of this sample are still 
unable to comprehend that the whole need not be destroyed when 
comparing part with whole, while 88 per cent, either thro.ugh 
trial and error or spontaneous understanding are able to perform 
class inclusion operations. 
At the seven year level it appears that the observed change 
between stage 1 and stage 3 is taking place. 
The data in table 9 appears to provide support for the 
postulate (p.2) that until the child is capable of establishing a 
permanent relation of part with whole, he will not be able to 
grasp that boys anq men are part of the class of males and girls 
and women are part of the class of females. The .age at which 
this takes place has important implications for the c.ogni tive 
developmental interpretation of identification. 
Implications for Identification 
In terms of the cognitive developmental interpretation of ident-
fication, i.eo that identification is the aonsequenae rather than the 
aause of gender identity as in traditional theories, our evidence of 
gender class inclusion occurring at 7 years of .age has interesti.ng 
implications: 
In previous sections we have described how the child's egocentric 
thinking, and later the general principal of homphily tends to lead to 
valui.ng of that which is 'like self' and to affiliation. The tendency 
to imitate, as. Piaget (1952) has documented, is a product of the child's 
108. 
desire to master or demonstrate a causal control of interesting 
environmental events. Through 'circular reaction' (Pi.aget, 194 7), 
the child only imitates those activities of people that are already 
in his repertoire, then gradually thr~ugh extension of his schema 
b.egins to imitate new acts of the model. 
When we come to consider a totalistic form of identification 
in which the general traits, attitudes and values of the same-sex 
mode 1 represen ti_ng the child's conception of a particular person, 
we discover that for the model to be perceived as conceptually simi-
lar to the self, it requires a certain level of cognitive structural 
development to take placebeforesuch a conception is possible. The 
c.ognitive structure required is the ability to additively compose 
classes, i.e. class inclusion, which accordi_ng to our findi.ngs only 
takes place around the .age of 7 years. At 5 - 6 years we observe 
how the child is able to classify on the basis of similar attributes. 
He understands that he is a boy am~ngst the class of boys, at this 
.age the child can perform the operation of logically comapri.ng part 
with part. The boy's classification of adult males in a more cogni-
tively advanced achievement and for this reason it follows from his 
ability to classify other boys in the same category. It is now, not 
only, "I am a boy in the class of boys", but "I am a boy in the class 
of males", and he is now able to expand his cat.egory of "males" to 
include the same-sex ~igures of diverse .ages particularly the same-
sex adults. (see chapter, Gender-.Age-Time). The 'like self' nature 
of the category facilitates stable empathy and affiliative relation-
ships. It is at this point that modelling tends to become part of a 
Table 9: The number of responses falling into each of the 
three stages on the Gender Class Inclusion Task 
and the two Control tasks, (a) flowers, (b) 
children. 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
N Obs. 
Ge.nder 100 43 
Control A 100 41 
Control B 100 51 






x = 4. 48448, 
Exp. Obs. Exp. 
45 25 23.7 
45 29 23.7 




df = 4, p > . 250 
Stage 3 
Obs. Exp. 




unique relationship of identification or as Ausubel (1957) refers to 
it, "Satellization", in which the desire of proximity, compliance 
dependence and approval become integrated. 
The Parallel Development of Gender Class Inclusion and Physical 
Class ·Inclusion 
In order to further demonstrate the cognitive developmental theme 
that the child's organization of his social and sexual cognition under-
goes the same radical transformations with _age development as his basic 
cognitive organization of his physical world, the performance on the 
gender task was compared with the children's performance on the two 
control tasks (a) flowers (b) children presented in Table 9. 
Treatment of Responses and Discussion of Results 
The responses of all subjects between 5 and 8 years of age who were 
administered the ·class inclusion tasks (N = 100) were sorted in terms of 
whether their responses were categorized as stage 1,. st_age 2 or st_age 3. 
Table 9 shows the number of responses falling into each of the three 
stages for the_ gender task in comparison to the two control tasks, (a) 
class inclusion with flowers and (b) class inclusion with children. 
In order to demonstrate the parallel development of gender class 
inclusion with physical class inclusion, the pattern of results across 
stages for each task was considered. The chi-square test was selected 
to demonstrate the similarity. Although the test is normally used to 
show that patterns are dissimilar when the chi-square is significant, the 
purpose here is to obtain a significantly insignificant chi-square in 
order to demonstrate the null hypothesis. 
2 . 
x = 4048448, df = 4, p > .• 250 
The null hypothesis is accepted. 
The c_ognitive developmental theme that sex-typing is an aspect of 
cognitive growth involving basic qualitative changes with age in the 
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·child's mode of thinking and concommitantly in his percpetions . 
of both his physical and social work appears to be supported by 
the g.bove data. 
Structural Errors in Composing Classes 
These are two forms of difficulty which the child experiences in 
attempting to additively compose classes: (Piaget, 1929) (a) At early 
. . .. "'\ 
stages the child's th~ught still reflects reaZism -- his thinki_ng in 
concrete and physicalistic in nature, which prevents him from con-
ceiving of two sets of elements in the same class at once which is the 
error of extension. The concept 'boys' or _'girls' are to the child a 
real spatial entity and are, in a sense, 'used up' so that by putti_ng 
them in one class he is not able to put them in another class. 
(b) The error of intension is that the child is unable to 
conceive of· a si.ngle element as possessi_ng two properties at once. 
For these children a boy cannot be both a 'boy' and a male at the 
same time. 
By 7 years, once the child has developed the necessary mental 
structures, he appears to overcome his diffucl ties due to his earlier 
realism. He is now able to return to the starting point of his mental 
construction and rec_ognize the same objects as being in a second class, 
possessing a second property. 
Finally, through investigation of gender class inclusion and 
discovering the relationship between the operations of a physical-
object nature and social-sexual nature it is apprppriate to quote 
Pi_aget: 
"To sum up we can now see why the additive hierarchy of 
classes, seriation of relationships, and operational 
generalization of number ••• appear at approximately 
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Summary 
This chapter describes the stages and sequence of operations in 
the development of what is called 'gender class inclusion', which is 
the ability to understand that boys, girls, men and women are sub-
ordinate categories of a class of beings; males and females. The 
argument is put forward that it is not until the child is capable 
of perceiving the same-sex adult model as a member of the same class 
that he will be able to consistently model or identify with adult 
members of that class. This means that the boy of six or seven 
years, for example, only begins to realise the 'like self' nature 
of the father's gender when he is able to see him as a man in the 
class of males, and himself as a boy in the same category. Such 
an understanding implies ~grasp of operations to additively compose 
classes or class inclusion. 
Experimental support is provided for the two postulates: 
(p.l) In spite of the fact that the child of 5-6 years is able to 
grasp the operation of comparing part with part in the classification 
of boy, girl, man or woman into correct groupings on the basis of a 
number of common properties; he is still not able to understand the 
relations among different levels of an hierarchy, which is the 
problem of comparing part wi1:h the whole. 
(p.2) Until the child is capable of establishing a permanent relation 
of part with the whole (class inclusion) at seven years of age, he 
will not be able to grasp that boys and men are part of the class of 
males and girls and women are part of the class of females. 
The measures used to .assess gender class inclusion operations was 
devised by ,.the author on the basis of Pi.aget 1 s classic experiments. 
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Experimental support is also found for the. 'parallelism 1 hypothesis 
i.e. that the child's organization of his social and sexual cognition 
undergoes the same radical transformations with age development as 
his basic cognitive organization of his physical world. The 
children's performance on the gender inclusion task was compared with 
their performance on two control tasks taken from Inhelder and 
Pi_aget (1964). 
The implications of the age at which these operations take place 
is discussed in terms of the cognitive developmental interpretation 
of identification, i.e. that identification proper depends on the 
ability to conceive of one's own sex parent and oneself in the 
same class of beings 1 that identification is the oonsequenoe rather 




Up to now, we have been considering the development of the 
operations children use to group or cat_egorize concepts permitting· 
them to create orde:i:, and to understand their own position in the 
social structure with regard to their gender role. 
A particularly important aspect in the gradual stabilization 
of gender identity between the years three to seven relates to 
the child's understandi_ng of 'lived time' or _ageing. This is 
important not only from the point of view that a secure. gender 
identity involves the child's.ability to recognise the permanence 
of gender ascription in spite of ch~nges in size or _age, but further, 
it permits him to understand that a sex-role definition also involves 
an _age-role definition. For example, the sex-role at five is speci-
fie to the attributes of a five-year old, and different from a sex-
role at twenty-five. Which means that at each age a sex-role is 
specified for that level. 
There are only two papers that we are aware of which touch on 
the problem of gender _age role definition -- Kohlberg (1966) and 
Hartley (1964b). Kohlberg postulates, 
"The first basic social differentiation made 
by children is that of age - size (babies, 
boys and girls, and_ grown-ups), a differen-
tiation. that precedes gender differentiation. 
Conc.epts of age (time) are more difficult 
than size concepts, and are assimilated to the 
later." (p .101) 
He provides an anecdotal observation of comments made by four 
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year old Jimmy to his 4~ year old friend Johnny: 
Johnny: I am goi.ng to be an airplane builder when I grow up. 
Jimmy: When r. grow up I I 11 be a Mommy. 
Johhny: No, you can't be a Mommy, you have to be a Daddy. 
Jimmy: No, I'm goi_ng to be a Mommy. 
Johhny: No, you're not a girl, you can't be a Mommy. 
Jimmy: · Yes, I can. 
Another example he gives is: 
"Philip (aged 3 years, 10 months) told his mother, 
"When you grow up to be a Daddy, you can 
have a bicycle too, (like his father)." 
(p. 95) 
Hartley was concerned in discoveri_ng what form of learning 
processes there are which function to specify the appropriate be-
haviour out of a matrix of all those possible behaviours at each 
.age. She felt that it was possible that role cognitions and ex-
pectations may develop in anticipation of future statuses by per-
ception of role-implementation by older persons, much like the 
development of the 'c_ognitive-maps '· of Tolman. 
"Although sex-role implementation can be assessed 
only at the current .age status of the subject, 
sex-role definition proceeds on a multiple track, 
dependi.ng on the perceptibility of differences 
among sex-age-role status and the verity of ex-
posure of the subjects. ll9~~b, p.3.) 
However, her paper is only speculative as, 
"A search of the literature and a widespread 
enquiry be correspondence has been si.ngularly 
unavailable with regard to systematically 
collected data which could blue-print such 
processes " (19~4b, p.4) 
0perations of Time 
llS. 
These have been a number of studies made on the growth of the 
child's understanding of time: Stuart, 1952; Aines, 1964; Bradley, 
1948; Springer, 1952; and Lovell and Slater, 1962; however they are 
of little value to us all these studies except Lovell and Slater's, 
emphasise such aspects as knowledge of time words, telli.ng the time, 
and the ability to appreciate universal time. 
We have been very :f;ortunate however, , in having available an 
early study of Pi.aget 's (1946), which has only recently been trans-
lated into English -- "The Child's Conception of Time" (_1969}. Piaget's 
analysis of st.ages in the development of the child's conception of .age 
provided the necessary foundation for our investigation of the process-
es relative to. gender-age acquisition. 
Piaget himself, mentions how the development of the child's con-
ception of time remained elusive to him as the time relationships 
constructed by young people depended so much on what they hear from 
adults and not from their own experiences; it was only after he had 
successfully applied the concept of . 'groupi.ng' to the child's concep-
tion of number and quantity that it was a relatively easy step for 
him to applied the same approach to the concept of motion, velo~ity, 
then time. 
Piaget b.egan his invest.igation by tryi.ng to discover how the 
child succeeds in organizi.ng the time of external events, at first 
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intuitively, and then by a set of qualitative operations. He found 
that at the intuitive level, the child, in accordance with the 
general laws characteristic at that level, judges physical time as 
if it were 'inner time', i.e. as if it contracted and expanded with 
the contents that have to be timed. As a result, he fails to_ grasp 
the idea of homogeneous time, common to all phenomena (Pi_aget, 1969, 
p.197). For example, if two actions take place in equal intervals 
of time, but one takes place more rapidly than the other, then the 
child will say that the former takes longer, while the older child 
can correct his judgement by disti_nguishi_ng between subjective and 
objective time. 
Some of Piaget's experiments were extremely i_ngenious in investi-
gating and identifying the elementary operations involved in the 
construction : of psychol_ogl.cal time. The simple experimental si tua-
tions which were performed before the child dealt with. (a) simulta-
neity, (b) the sequence of events, and (c) duration. Pi_aget maintained 
that if time is really the co-ordination of motions in space, then we 
must be able to discover the existence of operational time involving 
relations of succession and duration based on anal_agous operations 
in logic. He makes a clear distinction between operational time and 
intuitive time which is limited to successions and durations given 
by direct perception. Had Piaget not departed from the old intro-
spective shcool of psychology based on the adult view that there is 
a distinction between 'outer' time and 'inner' time -- that inner 
time can be grasped by introspection, while external time must be 
constructed -- he would never have been able to document the child's 
successive operations in acquiri.ng the concept of time. In his 
own words, 
"Introspection, which is a form of derived conduct 
gives us nothing but incomplete and deceptive 
information: being utilitarian it can tell us about 
the products of our mental operations, but nothi.ng 
about their mechanisms." (1969, p.197.) 
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A c.ognitive developmental approach to time, which Piaget adopts, 
however, assumes that time may be constructed by true operations 
permitti.ng qualitative comparisons, seriations, and colligations 
depending on whether the operations involved are anal.agous to those 
involved in classes and l.ogical relations, or whether numerical uni ts 
come into play. 
We are particularly interested in tracing the development of the 
concept of .age which involved ideas of biol.ogical. growth and also 
total duration. Piaget takes his cue from an early study by Decroly 
(1932), who observed the spontaneous reactions of his own daughter 
between the .ages of 4 and 6 years. Decroly's conclusion was that 
young children tend to confuse .age with height - - as if .agei.ng were 
tantamount to growing. Further, from the responses elicited by 
Decroly when he asked several. groups of children how old they were 
last year, how old they would be next year, and how old they were 
at birth; 75 per cent of his subjects failed to give the correct 
answers to the first two questions, while question 3 eluded even 
older children. Piaget's subsequent experiments of a similar nature 
lead him to the conclusion that for the young child .age meant growth, 
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and was not dependent upon order of birth. Adults remained at the 
same age because they had 'ceased to grow'. But as the child 
developed, he gradually came to realise that .age was dependent 
upon the date of birth, although he believed that differences in 
age could still be modified with time, so that a_oyounger smaller 
child could reach the same .age as an older one when the former grew 
to the same size as the other. Only at about the age 7 - 8 years, 
did Pi.aget find that children understood that birth order was the 
decisive factor determining age. 
The Link Between Gender, Size and Age 
In order for us to invest.igate the type of statement as made 
by four year old Johnny to his fried, "When I grow up I'll be a 
Mommy", and Philip to his mother, "When you grow up to be a Daddy 
you can have a bicycle too", we need to establish a theoretical 
framewort incorporati.n~ gender, size and .age concepts. 
In the previous section on 'gender-size' we demonstrated how, 
due to the young child's intuitive and physicalistic thinking, size 
is a very convenient yardstick by which he distinguishes between the 
sexes -- boys are bigger and stro.nger than girls; male dogs are 
bigger and stro.nger than female dogs. At the same time Piaget (1969) 
has documented how this physicalistic intuitive thought leads young 
children to believe that as they grow older and bigger they catch 
up with their elders. 
"One thi.ng in particular strikes one directly 
namely the static and almost discontinuous 
character of the child's idea of age. To 
him .ageing is not a perpetual and continous 
process, but rather a process of change tending 
toward certain states; time.ceases to flow once 
these states are attained. ·That is precisely 
why young children equate _age~ng with growi_ng 
up: when growi_ng stops, time apparently ceases 
to operate." (p. 202, 1969.) 
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As a strat_egy of enquiry we have attempted to theoretically 
link the child's concept o~ gender, size and _age by the following 
l_ogic: If the preconceptual child intutively makes dinstinction 
about. gender on the basis of size as we have indicated, and if (as 
Pi.aget documents) children's early intuitions about .agei_ng (or 
lived time) are connected with becomi_ng b.igger or. growi.ng up, then 
it should not be difficult to reveal the connection between _ageing 
an~ gender definition, which puts us in the position where we can 
interpret a yo'L1:11g child's statement like, "When I. grow into a 
Mommy ... " and understand the lpgic behind, "If I. grew b_igger than 
my sister, then I could be a boy if I wanted to." and "If I. grew 
older than Peter (age and size bei.ng synonymous) then I could be a 
boy." 
After directly questioni.ng "forty or so" 4 to 10 year old sub-
j ects about their conception of their .age, Pi.aget (1969) noted that 
there was a remarkable .agreement between the child's conception of 
.age and the child's conception of physical time as revealed in his 
earlier tests. The mechanisms that operate are the same in both 
cases. For· example, the construction of physical time requires the 
co-ordination of motions and' velocities which is demonstrated by 
Pi.aget' s experiments with two dolls that 'race 1 across the table. 
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Growth is comparable to the path traversed by the runner while 
ageing (_the rate of growth) to the differences in the velocities 
of the two runners. 
There are two fundamental errors that children under seven 
or e.ight tend to make: 
(_a) Duration -- both with the young child's age 
and his time concepts, duration is confused 
with the path traversed, artd 
(_b) Succession -- there is a lack of differen-
tiation between both spatial and temporal 
succession. 
With the eme.rgence of 'articulated intuitions' (stage 2) there 
is a partial connection of primitive intuitions, revealing itself 
either in succession (_the part in time becomes divorced from the 
part in space) or duration (more quickly = less time) which however, 
remain unco-ordinated until the appearance of operational co-ordina-
ti on at 7 - 8 ·years (st.age 3) . 
Piaget postulates the followi.ng: 
"If the views: we have presented are correct the 
child. begins by evaluating growth by its 
material results alone (height), and so comes 
to believe that greater stature necessarily 
corresponds to. greater age, irrespective of 
the rate of growth. On the other hand, as 
soon. as different. growth rates are introduced, 
.age is no longer treated as befog proportional 
to height alone, but to he.ight relative to the 
rate of growth. In other words, just as physi-
cal time is equal to distance/velocity, so age 
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is equal to height_/growth rate. (1969, p.218) 
For the young child in the preconceptual stage, size or 
stature is a major determinant of many of the intuitive judgements 
he makes abou~ gender differences (documental in our previous 
chapters) which is due to the concrete physicalistic thinking of 
the child at this age. Many of the sex-typed qualities and attri-
butes that the child discerns, such as strength, physical power, 
social power, competence, etc., originate from such size concepts 
to which they are assimilated. At the same time Pi_aget's investi-
gation into the child's conc~pt of _age indicates that '·'the child 
b_egins by evaluating growth by material results alone (h~ight), and 
so comes to believe that greater stature necessarily corresponds to 
greater age irrespective of rate of growth" (see above). This means 
that the child before the _age 7 - 8 uses stature to determine both 
_age, as well as many of the qualities that refer to gender. Hence, 
the l_ogical error by a four year old girl, "When r. grow up to be a 
Daddy .•• " which is a result of the following sequence: Size and 
age are t!quivalent. Males are bi_gger than females. Therefore a 
girl, by growing bigger relative to her brother.may grow into a 
man. 
PufPose 
The purpose of the present section is: 
(a) To examine the processes whereby children move 
from an articulated intuition of gender-age 
which is linked to physicalistic size, to a 
stage where, by means of operational realization 
they free themselves of concrete thinking 
and conceive of gender as a permanent cate~ 
gory irrespective of changes in size, _age 
or time. 
(b) To demonstrate the sequence of stages of the 
gender-age concept, and their relationship 
to the stages that Piaget conceptualized in 
his analysis of children's ideas of age. 
Postulate 
Hence the following postulation is presented: 
The stabiZization of gender-age categories foZZow after gender-
size oonoepts as they are assimiZated to the Zatter, ooau;t>ring 
at 7 yea:l's. 
Development of the Gender-Age Measure 
122. 
The gender-_age measure was developed from one of Pi_aget' s 
later more ingenious experiments, the purpose of which was to bring 
out clearly the operations of duration (the _ages themselves) and 
succession (the seriation of· births) in a projective form. While 
direct questioning is involved in the context of the measure, pro-
viding qualitative information about the process and the stage, 
care is taken to l!Void prejudiced answers by cross checking, as 
children's responses to questions about their ideas of age are 
likely to be influenced by discussions of the subject in the home 
which is more likely than discussion of any other temporal concept. 
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The measure consists of eleven drawi_ngs on cards measuri_ng 
9 x 11 cm. depicti_ng a brown dog and a grey dog who grow at 
different rates. The drawi_ngs are h_ighly stylised, presenti_ng a 
side view of each dog. 
The decision to use drawi_ngs of dogs at different _ages of 
life was made for the same reason that Pi_aget found it more satis-
factory to use drawings of trees rather than people which were 
likely to elicit automatic responses. But, more important, for 
our purposes in investigating gender, animal pictures permitted the 
isolation of size and height from other characteristics of human 
figures which would have· confounded the responses. Also, drawings 
of dogs which presented no cues about gender ass_ignments other than 
size, permit the subject to reassign the sex of the dogs as they 
grow, if he deemed it necessary: This is a feature of the test 
when a dissonance between size, age, and gender occurs. 
Different Growth Rates Between Brown Dog and Grey Dog (See App. S) 





, and five drawings of the_ grey dog which we have numbered 
G1 to GS. The sizes of the dogs are such that: 
(1) B6 > BS ) B4 > B3) B2 ) Bl 
(2) GS ) G 4 > G3 > G2 ') G1 
When the growth rates of the two dogs are compared 
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G4) BS 
GS ) B6 as the rate of growth of the grey dog overtakes 
the rate of growth of the brown dog. 
Administration 
S is presented with a 'photograph' of a small brown dog taken 
on its first birthday. He is then given the other five cards which 
are randomly arranged and asked to place the 'photographs' in the 
right order by age, which involves the seriation of the dog's from 
smaller to larger. 
The instructions are: 
"This picture of the brown dog (E places B before S) is a 'photo-
graph' takeit on~the day this brown dog had its first birthday. 
Each year the dog_ gets older. Now I want you to arrange the photo-
graphs by _age. Starti_ng with the first birthday photograph, put 
the pictures in the r_ight order." 
This simple seriation task was performed adequately by all 
subjects tested over the age of four years. Some subjects prefer 
to order the picture vertically while most seriate horizontally. 
After the seriation task, the child is told that when the 
brown dog was two years old, on its second birthday, a small grey 
d_og had its first birthday. 
E: "Here is a phot_ograph of the small grey dog on its first 
birthday." E places G1 next to B2• 
"And here is a phot_ograph of the same grey dog on its 
second birthday." E places G2 next to B3 . 
Pointing to B2, G1; E asks: 
"Which dog is older, the brown dog or the grey dog?" 
"How many years is it older than the other dog?" 
"Which is the boy dog, and which is the_ girl d_og?" 
"Can you be sure that you are r_ight?" 
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S may refuse to assess gender on the basis of size alone without 
further information, aski_ng, "What is the dog's name?" If so E says, 
"All right, let us say that this is the girl d_og (G2 ~ and this is the 
boy ~og (B3)
11 The ass_ignment corresponds with the sizes of the dogs 
as G2 is very much smaller than B3• Then E asks "Which clog is older?" 
"How many years is it older than the other dog?" 
After these questions E presents S with the remaining three 
'photographs' of the grey dog, G3, G4, and GS and instructs him to put 
them in the r_igh t order next to the brown dog. (G 3 = B 4, G 4 ) GS and 
Gs> B6). 
By correct spatial arrangement of the draw~ngs, the simultaneity 
of B2 and G1 , and B3 and G2 is implied without havi_ng to ask questions 
deaHng with their correspondence. The child is in fact forced, by 
preliminary double seriation, to bear the growth rates in mind, whether 
he judges age by size alone, or by the co-ordination of the starting 
and f inishi_ng points of the growth process. 
When the children realize the increase in the rate of growth of 
the grey dog as compared to the rate of growth of the brown dog, they . . . 
often express surprise and sometimes even excitement. The reason for 
this is very likely due to them havi_ng aJready ass_igned the_ grey d_og 
a female on the basis of size, and then suddenly noti_ng that it has 
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outstripped the male ~og, not only in growth rate, but in actual 
size. This creates a dissonance between size, .age and gender, which 
is investigated with further questioni.ng. 
E pointing to G 4 > BS asks: 
"Which dog is older?" 
"How many years is it older?" 
"Which is the boy ~og and which is the girl d.og?" 
and .again pointi.ng to GS} B6 : 
"Which ~og is older?" 
"How many years is it older?" 
"Which is the boy ~og and which is the. girl d.og?" 
The responses to the questions abou~ gender ass.ignment when it 
is devorced from .age or size reveal how the child copes with the 
dissonance. On the one hand, he may insist cat.egorically that gender, 
once assigned, must remain constant irrespective of .age or size cha.nges. 
On the other hand, he may find it quite permissable to change the 
ass.ignment. If so, he will say, "The. girl d.og has. grown up into a boy 
dog." E then raises objections such as, "Are you sure that the. grey 
~og is a boy now?· On this birthday (E points to G1 , B2) we .agreed 
that it was a girl." and "Can a girl d.og_ grow into a boy d.og?" 
Further, the.enquiry takes the form of a number of direct questions 
to the child about .age. This is also an opportunity to follow through 
any statements or responses by the child which appeared interesting or 
relevant. 
An example of the standard questions are: 
"How old are you?" 
"Have you got a brother or a sister? (or friend)" 
"Is he/she bigger than you?" 
"Is he/she older than you?" 
"If you grew bigger than him/her, would you become older?" . . . 
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"Who will be older when you are both grown up?" (or will you both 
be the same .age?) 
"Is your Mother older or younger than you?" 
"How do you know?" 
"Is your mother still growi.ng older, or has she stopped?" 
"Is she still. growi.ng b.i.gger, or has she stopped?" 
These questions provide further qualitative information about 
the way the child views .agei.ng -- whether it is related to size and 
ceases once adult size is reached, or whether it is seen as a con-
tinuaus process from the point of birth. 
Pilot Study 
Twelve children between the .ages of five and ten years were 
tested to check the adequacy of the procedure. Attention was paid to 
the phrasing and sequence of the standard questions and the suitability 
of the drawings. Some modifications were called for. 
With r.egard to the phrasi.ng of the questions, there was initially 
some indecision about whether to say "this is a photograph taken on 
the day the brown d.og was born", or "the day this brown d.og had its 
first birthday". The latter was found to be more easily understood. 
Also, after a number of tests, it was decided to re-do the draw-
i.ngs depicti.ng the. growth rate of the. grey d.og, maki.ng G1 and G2 
smaller than the original, and G4 and G5 larger than the original in 
Table 10: 1be scores of children between 5 and 8 years on the 



























































order to emphasize the difference in the rates o~ growth. 
Number and Age of Subjects 
One hundred children were tested -- from five years to e.ight 
years. of age, with twenty five children in each group, consisti.ng 
of boys and girls equally divided. (See table 1) 
Categorization of Responses into Stages 
Stage 1. (5 - 6 years) 
During the first st.age, .age is independent of the order of 
births, and age differences are tho.ught to become modified -- with 
. . . 
time conceived as a heterogeneous flux. There is a total lack of 
differentiation between size and .age. 
Gender is intuitively linked with size due to the concrete 
th0t.~ght of the child. Growing bi_gger is synonymous with_ growing 
older, so that the responses of a child at this st.age to the_ gender-
.age measure indicates that he believes that if the small_ grey female 
d_og_ grew b_igger than the brown male dog, not only will she_ grow older 
than him but that it is possible for her to grow into boy dog. The 
'young child's intuitions derived from size do not lead them to see 
any incongruence in such reasoni_ng. However when questions refer to 
the child itself, a girl for example, will believe that if she_ grew 
b_i_gger than her brother, she would_ grow older,· but .egocentric self-
labelling makes her reluctant to admit that she would therefore grow 
into a boy. The child at this s~age admits it is possible but 
~ighly unlikely. 
Stage 2. (6 - 7 years) 
The intuitions of the child at this st.age becpme articulated, 
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leadi_ng to either. one of two conclusions in relation to the constancy 
of gender assignment.; The child believes that: 
(a) th~ugh age differences are not consistently maintained 
throughout life, _age depends on the order of births (suaaession), or 
(b) the differences are maintained (dU!'ation), but they do no~ 
depend on the order of births. 
The child who uses the former reasoni_ng maintains that the ini-
tial assignment cannot be altered. The stre.ngth of this assertion 
depends on the degree that he has freed himself from the limitations 
of sized-based intuitions. Many of the children at this stage, refer-. . 
ri.ng to G
5
, B6 will insist that the. grey <I:og is a boy d.og and the 
brown dog is a. ·girl d,og, somehow fo.rgetti.ng that he just previously 
said that G
1 
was a female. When this is pointed out to them by 
drawi.ng their attention to G1 and aski.ng, "Didn't you say that at this 
birthday the_ girl dog was a. girl d_og?" They .agree saying, "Yes, it is 
a girl." When their attention is then directed to GS they maintain 
that it is a boy dog without any awareness of the contradiction. Even 
th~ugh they realise that it is the same dog in each case, and that a 
girl-dog cannot grow into a p_oy-dog, their error appears to be caused 
thr~ugh their inahiZity to decenter; they center on the relationship 
between G1 , B2 and GS' B6 -- .ignoring the continuity. 
The child who uses the latter reasoni?g maintains that the gender 
ass.ignment remains constant, but when perceivi.ng the size of GS in 
relation to B
6
, will correct his initial ascription sayi.ng that he 
must have been wrong and that it should be altered. The b.ig d_og could 
not possibly be the female, it must be the male. The smaller brown 
dog· must be female. 
Stage 3. (8 years) 
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In the third st_age, finally duration and succession become 
co-ordinated as the child acquires the ability to decenter. The 
growth rate is treated as a ratio, and it is this ratio which permits 
the correlation of different rates of growth, hence the conception of 
durations and ages independently of space and size. Gender categori-
zations become independent of age and size changes. 
Treatment of Responses and Discussion of Results 
The children's responses to the Gender Age Measure were categori-
zed into three stages according to Piaget's criteria of levels of 
operation described above. Each child's response was given a score 
of 1, 2 or 3 depending on the stage in which it was categorized. 
. . . 
The one way analysis of variance (1 way anova) was the statisti-
cal procedure employed to investigate the developmental trends 
between the ages of five and eight years of age. 
The null hypothesis tested by the analysis of variance is that 
there is no significant difference between the mean square of the 
scores between age groups and the mean square of the scores within 
each age group. 
H1 is that the mean square between is significantly larger 
than the mean square within groups. 
The results appear in Table 10. 
F = 34.349, df = 3, 96 p < .01 
The null hypothesis is rejected. The values of the means of the 
sample age groups tested are significantly different. We observe 
an orderly progression in the values of the means for each age 
group; The mean of the five year old group is 1.24 (SD= .44), 
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the six year olds is x = 1.52 (SD = .65), the seven year olds is 
x :!: 2. 32 (SD = . 9} and the eight year olds is x = 2. 84 (SD = .37). 
The question that subsequently has to be dealt with is are 
there any significant differences between any particular age group 
and the subsequent age group? This is the problem of isolating 
differences among sample means. Since all the samples weFe of the 
same size, on the basis of rejection of the overall null hypothesis, 
it is justifiable to conclude that the largest mean is significantly 
larger than the smallest mean, indicating that the Gender Age Measure 
reveals a developmental trend in the structure of the child's 
thought between five and eight years of age. However the rationale 
regarding the stabilization of the postulated gender-age categories 
(see above) states that this stabilization occurs at the seven 
year level. Does the data support this? 
A comparison of means between successive age groups using the 
Scheffe procedure was performed. At the .01 level a significant 
difference between the mean of the six year old and seven year old 
samples is observed (x = 1.52, x = 2.32 respectively). 
Scheff~ F = 6.808853, df = 3.96, p ( .01 
Further, at the .OS level, the comparison of successive means 
reveals a somewhat less significant difference between the means 
of the seven year old sample and eight year old sample (x = 2.32, 
x = 2.84 respecti.vely)_. 
Scheffe f = 2.8766, df = 3, 96 p ( .os 
Interpreting the above for the light it casts on the structural 
changes in the level of c.ognitive operations at the various 
ages, we observe that the five year old sample with a mean of 
1. 24, the level of operations is predominantly stage 1. The 
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child at this stage reveals lack of differentiation between age and 
and size. He relies on physicalistic intuitive tho~ght dependent 
on structure to determine age, growth, and gender. 
The six year old sample with mean of 1.52, appear to be 
moving toward articulated intuitions (_stage 2). For them, 
age begins to depend on'. the order of births (_succession), or 
they are able to see how age differences are maintained (dura-
tion) but their inability to decenter leads them to fall into 
error. 
At seven years of age we observe the significant departure 
from stage 2 to stage 3. The child at this age acquires the 
ability to decenter enabling him to co-ordinate duration and 
succession. The growth rate is treated as a ratio, and it is 
this ratio which permits the correlation of different rates 
of growth, hence the conception of durations and ages 
independently of space and time. Gender categorizations become 
independent of age and size changes. 
The above data appears to confirm our postulate that the 
stabilization of gender-age categories follow after gender-size 
concepts as they are assimilated to the latter, occuring at 
7 years. 
Qualitative Trends 
Sta~e 1. Below are relevant extractions from protocols of 
children giving an indication of the structure of their reason-
ing at Stage 1. Steven (6:3): Seriates all the 'photographs' 
of the brown dog (B1 to B6) accordi.ng instructions. 
E: When the brown dog was two years old, on its second 
birthday a small grey dog had its first birthday. 
Here is a 'photograph' of the small grey dog on its 
first birthday. (E placed G1 next to B2), and here 
is a photograph of the same. grey dog on its second 
birthday (E places G2 next to B3). 
E: Which dog is older -- the 
brown dog or the grey dog? 
Steven: The brown dog (B2). 
E: How many years is it older than the other dog? 
Steven: Two years (erroneously). 
E: Which is the boy dog and which is 
Steven: (Pointfog) This is the boy (B2)' 
(Gl) • 
E: Can you be 
Steven: Yes. 
E: How? 
sure you are right? 
the girl d.og? 
and this is the girl 
Steven: They (girl dogs) are smaller and have got long tails. 
133. 
134. 
E: (Point~ng to B3, G2.) Here, which ~og is older? 
Steven: The brown d_og. (B
3
) 
E: How many years is it older than the other dog? 
Steven: 3 years (erroneously). 
E: Here are ~he other pho~ographs of th~ grey ~og in its third, 
fourth and fifth birthday. Put them in the right order· next 
to the brown ~og. 
Steven completes the task adequately. By correct spatial 
arr_aµgements of the brown and grey ~ogs, the simultaneity introduces 
preliminary double seriation forci_ng the child to bear the growth 
rates in mind whether he judges by size alone, or the co-ordination 





G 4 ) BS and GS ') B 6• ) 
E: (Pointi_ng to G4 ) BS) Which dog is older? 
Steven: The grey one (G
4
). 
E H · 1· t older?, : ow many years 1s 
Steven: Four years older. 
It is apparent that Steven is relying on size-based intuitions. 
His operational schemas are still centered, maki_ng it impossible to 
bear ratios in mind• The most he is capable of, is to center on the 
direct comparison between the grey d_og (G4) which is now relatively 
larger, and brown d_og (BS) which is relatively smaller. Not only is 
there an actual increase in size, but a relative increase in size of 
the grey dog which steven ascribed female. The dissonance between 
_age, size and_ gender is investigated by further questioning: 
E: (Pointi_ng to G4 ) BS.) Which is the boy-dog and which is the 
girl-dog? 
~ .... . .. ·. 
Steven: (Spontaneously.) This is the. girl-d.og (pointing to the 
relatively smaller brown ~og) and this is the boy-dog 
(pointi.ng to the relatively l~rger. grey d.og). 
E: Can a boy do~ grow into a girl dog? 
Steven: No. 
135. 
W: Well, are you sure that the. grey d.og is a boy now. On this 
birthday (G1 < B2) we .agreed it was a. girl. 
Steven: Oh no! The. grey dog is a. gir 11 
Steven's centered intuition derived from size results in the 
problem eluding him. For him size is equivalent to .age, and rate of 
growth is equivalent to rate of _age~ng. Gender ascription, in the · 
absence of further discriminati.ng cues is also based on size. This 
becomes obyious from the f ollowi.ng: 
E: How old are you? 
Steven: Six. 
E: Have you got a brother or a sister? 
Steven: I've got a brother. He's ten. 
E: Is he b_igger than you? 
Steven: Yes. 
E: Is he older than you? 
Steven: Yes. 
E: If yo~ grew b.igger than him, Would you become older? 
Steven: Yes. 
E: Who will be older when you are both_ grown up? 
Steven: We will both be the same. 
E: Why?. 
136. 
Steven: Because we will be the same size. 
E: Is your mother older or younger than you? 
Steven: Older. 
E: How do you know? 
Steven: She is taller. 
E: And if you get as tall as her? · 
Steven: Then we will be the same .age. 
E: Is your mother still. growi.ng older? 
Steven: Yes; she's. growi.ng b i.gger too! 
Jenine (6:4) also demonstrates the inability of the child at 
stage 1 to maintain equivalences in ageing irrespective of rates 
' ' ' 
of growth. 




.) Which is the. girl-d.og and which 
is the boy-dog? 
Jenine: The small one is the. girl. The b.ig one is the boy. 
E: Can you be sure you are r.ight? 
Jenine: Yes. The size is not the same. 
E : (Referri.ng to G2 < B3.) Which d.og is older? 
Jenine: The b.igger one (B3). 
E: How many years is it older than the other d.og? 
Jenine: (Erroneously) Three. 
Also, later in the test, when there occurs a dissonance bwtween 
size, .age, and ascribed gender, Jenine consistently maintains that 
the larger dog is older. When asked how many years it is older than 
the other d.og, when G4 ) BS and GS) B6 , she replies that the. grey 
d.og becomes four years older, then five years older. The child at 
st_age 1 neither depends on· order of births (duration) nor are 
differences maintained throughout life (succession). 
137. 
E: (Pointi_ng to GS) B6 .) Which is the girl-d_og and which is 
the boy-d_og? 
Jenine: That one (B6) is the_ girl now, and that one (GS) is the boy. 
E: Are you sure the grey dog is a boy now? 
Jenine: Yes. 
E: But on this birthday (G
1 
( B2) we _agreed that it was a boy. 
Jenine: Yes • • • Oh no! I keep fo_rgetti_ng how theY: grow. The smaller 
one must be the girl and the b.ig one is the boy. They aan 't 
ch3:nge ••• 
Jenine becomes thoroughly confused as she is faced with the · 
apparent contradictiOil' that (a) the boyftd_og is always b_i_gger than 
the girl-dog, (b) she has already cat_egorized the grey dog as a female, 
now it has. grown b_igger than the brown ~og, yet (c) a girl can' "t: grow 
into a boy. This is an example of the difficulties that confront a 
child at the level of physicalistic intuition, when rate o~ growth 
and ageing are synonymous. 
E: Jenine, how old are you? 
Jenine: Six. 
E : Have you got a brother or a sister? 
Jenine: Yes, a sister. She's three. 
E: Is she smaller or b_igger than you? 
Jenine: Yes, smaller. 
E: If she_ grew b_i_gger than you would she become older than you? 
Jenine: Only if she_ grows bi_gger than me. But I eat more than her. 
138. 
E: Who will be older when you are both grown up. 
Jenine: We will be the same. 
E: Is your mother older or yo'll:nger than you? 
Jenine: Older. 
E : How do you know? 
Jenine : She's b.i.gger and I haven'~ grown up yet. 
E: But when you g~ow: up will you stop growi.ng older? 
Jenine: No, I' 11 keep growi_ng. 
E: When you are as b_ig as your mother will you keep on getting 
older? 
Jenine: No, we'll be the same. 
Some children at st.age 1 whose protocols reveal the typical 
difficulties in co-ordina ti.ng the age and_ gender of the d_ogs, pro-
vide evidence of a movement toward articulated intuitions (st_age 2): 
E: Lawrence is your mother older or younger than you? 
Lawrence: (5 :6) :: Qlder. 
E: How do you know? 
Lawrence: She's b_i_gger. (He pauses, then on further reflection adds) 
You can count her candles on her cake and then you look at 
your candles and you know that you are smaller. 
Stage 2: Articulated intuitions 
I .~ • 
At this stage, there is ~ par'.{:ial connection of primitive intui-
. ' 
tion, reveall~ng itself either in suctession (the part in time be-
,. 
comes divorced from t~e part in space) or duration (more quickly = 
less time) which however remains unconnected unti1 t~e ·appearance of 
operational co-ordination at 7 - 8 years (St_age 3). 
! . ;;, 
139 •. 
In the protocols of children at St.age 2 we find: (a) though 
.age differences are not maintained throughout life, .age depends on 
the order of births. (b} Age differenaes are maintained by they 
do not depend on order of births. 
With r.egard to. gender, the child maintains that the initial 
ass.ignment cannot be altered or (b) the initial ass.ignment was in-
correct. Some children still intuitively link. gender with size, but 
the strength of the assertion, i.e. whether (a) or (b), depends on 
the degree to which the child has freed himself from size. 
Jacques (6:5) understands the concept more quickly = Zess time. 
E: (Pointi.ng to G4 ) B5) Which dog is older? 
Jacques: The brown dog. 
E: How many years is it older? 
Jacques: The. grey dog is four years old (counti.ng) and the brown 
d.og is five years old. 
E: How many years is the brown d.og otder.a than th~ grey dog? 
Jacques cannot. grasp this, he b.egins counti.ng .again. 
E: How old are you, Jacques? 
Jacques: Six. 
E: Have yo~ got a brother or sister? 
Jacques: Yes, a sister. She is yo~nger. 
E: If she grew b.i.gger than you would she become older? 
Jacques: Yes. 
E: Is your mother older or younger than you? 
Jacques: Older. 
E: How do you know? 
140. 
Jacques: Because she is taller and she's had more birthdays than me. 
Heather (7: 1) is still unable to co-ordinate the ratio .. of dura-
tion and succession. She keeps. guessi.ng the .ages of the ~ogs. When 
asked if she would grow older than her friend, Amanda, (8 years), 
she says no. She does not believe that if she grew b.i.gger she would 
become older. 
E: Who will be older when you are both grown up? 
Heather: She will. 
E: Is your mother older or you?ger than you? 
Heather: Older and bi.gger. 
E: How do you know. 
Heather: I know how old she is. She was born before me. 
E: Is your mother still. growi.ng older? 
Heather: Yes. 
E: Is she still. growing b.i.gger? 
Heather: Yes. Much b.i.gger. She's dieti.ng now. 
E: When you are as b.ig as her will you be as old as her? 
Heather: No. 
Stage 3: 0perational Co-ordination 
For the child at this st.age succession and duration are fully 
co-ordinated, rate of growth is no longer ana~agous to rate of ~ge­
fog. .Ageing is dependent upon order of birth, and these differences 
are maintained throughout life. Gender ca~egorizations are free of 
size and .age ch~nges. 
141. 
SlUillilary 
In this chapter we have described the st.ages and sequence of 
operations in the development of the child's concept of gender, age, 
and time. 1he research strategy is both theoretically and practi-
cally related to Piaget's investigations through discovering how 
the child succeeds in organizing the time of external events, at 
first, intuitively and then by a set of qualitative operations. 
The following postulation is demonstrated: 
The stabilization of gender-age categories foZZ()U) a~er gender-
size concepts as they are assirrriZated to the latter, occurring 
at ? ye<X!'s. 
1he findings are categorized into st.ages and presented in 
tabular form showing the relationship between the sequence of the 
stage and age of subjects. Qualitative trends revealing the logical 
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GENDER IDENTITY 
Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Date tested: ..... / ...•. / •...• 
Date of Birth ... / ..... / ..... 
Age : 
E presents S with a cut-out picture of a 
clothed boy. 
Sex 
Time : ........ . 
SCORES 
E We are going to play a game with this cut-out 
child. 






First give this child a name. s . .......... . 
Is it a boy or a girl ? (Gi r 1 = 0 ' Boy = 21) 
Could he be a girl if he wanted to ? 
(Yes = 0' No = 3) 
Could he be a girl if we put gi.rl~s clothes 
on him ? (E places cut-out dress over boy's 
clothes) (Yes = 0, No = 4) 
Could he be a girl if we let him grow his 
hair long and have a girl's hairstyle ? 
(leaving dress on, E places cut-out girl's 
hairstyle over boy's hair) (Yes = 0 ' No = 5) 
Could ~e be a girl if he played girl's games 
with the girls ? (E places figure onto a 
background of girls playing) (YeB = 0, No = 6) 
TOTAL: 
Further questions and child's comments: 
....... 
20/ 
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Atr('n cl ix 2.. 
·ENDER SIZE 
Name . ........................... 
Date tested: ....... / ..... / ..... 
Date of Birth: ..... / ..... / ..... 
Sex 
Age : ..... ...................... Time 
. . ...... . 
Here are drawings of two dogs I saw sitting in the street. Are 
they the same kind? How are they different ? (S specifies.) 
Right, they are two different tyves of dogs. The one is big, 
has pointed ears and short hair and the other is small with long 
hair and long ears. They are not alike at all. Now I would 
like you to tell me, simply by looking at these drawings, which 
of the dogs is a girl dog, and which is the bov dog . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 
e e s e e e ll e • e e I e e e ' • e I e e e e e • e e e e e e e e e e e lit e e e e e ' • e e • I e I e e I e e e e • e e e I a 
Can you be sure you are right ? s : ......................... . 
a) s bases answer on size. 
b) The S consistently maintains gender in size based in spite of 
objections by E. 
c) The S initially bases answer on size, but on further auestioning 
becomes uncertain or changes his mind. 
E's objections to (a) : But aren't there ·big girls and small 
boys ? Aren't there big women and small men ? 
S's responses : ............ · ... • · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
d) Subject refuses to guess, or requires further information such 




Name . . . . . . . . . . . . Sex . . . . . 
Date tested . . . I . . I . . . . . . . 
Date of Birth . . . I . . I . . . . . .. . 
Age . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Time 
1. S is presented with a heterogeneous assortment of pictures 
of plants, animals, people and geometric forms. 
E Here are some pictures of different things all mixed 
up. Now I want you to put together the things that 
belong together. Sort them out and put them into 
piles as quickly as you can. Tell me when you are 
finished. 
Time taken S's comments and 
E's observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2. S is presented with an assortment of different species of 
animals. E gives same instructions as above. 
Time taken S's comments and 
E's observations 
e • e I e t I t t I e •I • I t I t I t e e I I t t I I t t I t I t I t I t I I t e t t ' I I I t 
3. S is presented with a shuffled pile of pictures of adults 
and children, four men, four women, four boys, four girls. 
E Here are some pictures of people all mixed up. Now 
I want you to put the people into groups where they 
belong. Put the people together who belong together. 
Each group must be different. Tell me when you 
are finished. 
T irne t.aken 
Observations t I I t t I • I t t t I • I I I I t I t • I I e t I I I j I I t I I 
I I I • i e t I I i I t t I t t I I I t t I t I o I t I I I I t t I I I I I I I t I t I t t I t 
................................................ 
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Arpend/t i.f. 
DDI~IVE COMPOSITION TASKS 
. Name . ........................ Sex . ........ . 
Date tested: ...... / .... / ... . 
Date of Birth: ...• / ...• / .... 
Age: ........................ Time . . . . . . . . . . 
. Flowers 
S is presented with a picture of flowers consisting of twenty poppies 
and two daisies. 
E : Look. Are there a lot of flowers or a few in this field ? 
S : (A lot) .•...•.•...•. E : What colour are they? S : (Red 
and yellow) ................... E The red ones are poppies and 
the yellow ones are daisies. I want to make a very big bunch. 
Must I pick the flowers or the poppies? S : (The poppies) •....... 
Show me the poppies. (S indicates) E : Show me the flowers. 
(S indicates the whole drawing). E : Then will the bunch be 
bigger if I pick the flowers or the poppies ? 
S ((a) If you pick tli.e poppies) ............................. .. 
((b) If you pick the flowers) .............................. . 
E If I pick the poppies what will be left ? S : (The daisies) •...... 
E And if I pick the daisies what will be left ? S : (Nothing 
at all) .................. Then what will be bigger the bunch 
of flowers or the bunch of poppies ? S : (The bunch of poppies) 
. ; .................. . And what about the bunch of flowers ? 
Will it be bizger or smaller ? 
S Smaller ................. E: Why? S : (Because you've made 
a bunch of poppies) .......................................... . 
2. Children 
I 
S is presented with· twelve girls and two boys 
E Are there more girls or more children in this class ? 
s (More g i r 1 s ) ....•......................... 
But aren't girls children? S : (Yes) .................... . 
Then are there more children or more girls ? S : (More girls) 
3. Gender - Males 
S is presented with a group of males consisting of ten boys and three 
men. 
E : Look at this picture. What does it show ? s : ................ 
All these people are males waiting for the bus. Show me the 
males. (S indicates) The younger ones are boys and the older 
bigger ones are men. Show me the boys (S indicates) Show 
me the men (S indicates) 
E If all the boys got into the bus would there by any males left ? 
S : (Yes, the men.) ......................... . And if all the 
~ales got into the bus would there be any left ? S : (No) ........ . 
E Then would the bus be fuller - if it had all the males, or if 
it had all the boys inside ? 
S ((a). If it had all the boys) ................................ . 
((b) If it had all the males) ............•.•................. 
If (a) then, but aren't boys males ? S : (Yes) ........... Then, 
~ould there be more males or more boys in the full bus ? 
S (More boys) . ... , ..............................................• 
4. Gender - Females 
S is presented with a group of females consisting of ten girls and 
three women. 
E : Look at this picture. What does it show ? s : ............ . 
All these people are females waiting to catch the bus. Show me 
the females. (S indicates) The younger ones are girls and 
the older, bigger qnes are women. Show me the girls. (S indicates) 
Show me the women. (S indicates) 
E If all the girls get into the bus would there be any females left ? 
S: (Yes the women) ........ ~ ........................ And if all 
the females got into the bus would there be any left ? 
S (No) ......................... . 
E Then would the bus be fuller - if it had all the females, or if 
it had all the girls inside ? 
S ((a) If it had all the girls) ............................. . 
((b) If it had all the females) ........................... . 
If (~) then, but aren't girls females ? S: (Yes) ........ . 
Then, would there be more females or more girls in a full bus ? 
S (More girls) ....................................... , ........ . 
O.~ ·--~ ' 
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Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sex . . ........ . 
Date tested: ...... / .... / ... . 
Date of Birth: ...• / •..• / .... 
Age : .•...•••......•..••• · · . · Time . . . . . . . . . . 
S is presented with six drawings of the same brown dog 'photographed' 
each year on the same date. 
E : This first picture (E points to G.1) is a 'photograph' taken on 
the day this brown dog had its first birthday. Each year the 
dog gets older. Now I want you to arrange the photographs 
by age. Starting with the first birthday photograph put the 
pictures one below the other in the right order. 
S Completes se.riation task without assistance ......•....•.•••. 
S Requires help .............................................. . 
After the seriation task. 
E : When the brown dog was two years old, on his second birthday, 
a small grey dog had its first birthday. Here is a photograph 
of the small grey dog on its first birthday. (E places G. 1 
next to B.2). And here is a photograph of the same grey 
dog on its second birthday. (E places G.2 next to B.3) 
E (Pointing at B.2, G.1) Which dog is older - the brown dog 
or the grey dog ? ( B. 2) s : .............................. . 
How many years is it older than the other dog ? (1 year) 
s : ....................................... ~ .................. . 
Which dog is the girl dog and which is the boy dog ? 
s : ......................................................... . 
Can you be sure you are right ? How ? s : ................. . 
s may. refuse to assess gender on the basis of size or age without 




All right, let us say ~hat this is the girl dog (G.2), and this 
is the boy dog· (B.3) 
Which dog is older ? (B.3) s : ............................. ~ 
How many years is it older than the other-dog (I year) 
s : ......................................................... . 
- 2 -
f. Seriating the remaining three grey dogs (G.3, G.4, G.5) 
E : Here are the other photographs of the grey dog on its third, 
fourth and fifth birthday. Put them in the right order next 
to the brown dog (G.3 = B.4, G.4~ B.5, G.5 >'B.6) 
>. Gender divorced from age or size 
(a) E (Pointing to G.4 ~ B.5) Which dog is older ? (B. 5) 
s .............................. ·• ......................... . 
How may years is it older? (I year) S : .•.....•............ 
Which is the boy dog and which is the girl dog ? 
s : ~ ......................................................... . 
(b) And again, E (Pointing to G.5>B.6) 
Which dog is older? S : .... , ......................... ~····· 
How many years is it older ? S : ........................... . 
Which is the girl dog and which is the boy dog ? 
s .: ......................................................... . 
The dissonance between size, age ~nd gender results in S changing 
gender assignment (c) 
or S constantly maintains gender categorization is independent of 
age + size changes (d) .......................................... . 
Final Check : 
I 
F raises the questions Are you sure the grey dog is a boy now ? 
On this birthday (G.1, G.2) we agreed that it was a girl . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Can a girl dog grow into a boy dog? ............................ . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
How old are you ? •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Have you got a 
brother of sister? (or friend)? ........••....•...... Is he/she 
bigger than you ? (Yes) Is he/she older than you ? If you 
grew bigger than would you become older ? ................. . 
Who will be older when you are both grown up ? .................. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Is your mother older or younger than you? ...................... . 
3 
How do you know ? .••••.•••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Is your mother still growing older ? 
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